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Abstract 
 The central feature of patent law in the chemical, biotechnology, and 
pharmaceutical industries is the genus claim—a patent that covers not just one 
specific chemical but a group of related chemicals. Genus claims are everywhere, and 
any patent lawyer will tell you they are critical to effective patent protection. 
 But as we show in this article, the law has changed dramatically in the last 
thirty years, to the point where it is nearly impossible to have a valid genus claim.  
Courts almost always hold them invalid, either at trial or on appeal.  Remarkably, 
courts do this without having acknowledged that they have fundamentally changed 
an important area of law. More remarkably, patent lawyers and patent owners don’t 
seem to have noticed. Invention, investment, patenting, and patent litigation 
continue much as they had before.  It’s just that the genus patents that are thought to 
be the basis of this activity generally end up invalid.   
 We document this surprising shift in the law. We explain why we think it 
represents both bad law and bad policy. We also explain why it hasn’t seemed to 
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 The most fundamental rule of patent law is that what the patentee owns is 
defined not by what she actually built or described, but by the patent claim—the 
legal definition of the invention drafted by her patent lawyer.  Lawyers draft those 
claims to be as broad as possible consistent with legal doctrine.  In particular, 
lawyers are careful not to limit the claim to a particular thing or “species,” even 
though that’s normally what the patentee actually built or conceived of.  Instead, 
patent lawyers lead with a “genus claim”—a broad patent claim that covers a group 
of structurally related products that incorporate the basic advance of the patented 
invention.5  They do that to make sure that no one can copy their basic idea but 
make a small change to it that avoids infringing the patent. 
 Nowhere is this more true than in the chemical arts.  Pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology, and chemical companies rely more heavily on the patent system than 
do other industries.  Some scholars have concluded that the system works well in 
those industries but not others.6  And those industries make heavy use of genus 
claims.  A chemical patent might include one or more claims to a particular 
chemical—a species—but almost invariably it starts with a claim to a group of 
chemicals. It bears emphasizing that these genus claims are thought important to 
prevent competitors from capturing the benefit of an invention while avoiding 
infringement by making a minor change to one aspect of a complex chemical.  The 
                                                          
5   See In re Kalm, 378 F.2d 959, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“When one speaks of a ‘genus’ in the 
chemical arts, one ordinarily speaks of a group of compounds closely related both in structure 
and properties.”). 
6   See infra Part III. 
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U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) grants broad genus claims as a matter of 
course in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries.  And those industries regularly 
enforce genus claims in court.7    
 When they do, however, something surprising happens.  As we show in this 
paper, genus claims are almost invariably held invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for 
failure to enable or describe the full scope of the claimed invention.  In the last 
thirty years, the Federal Circuit (the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
appeals) has struck down claim after claim on the theory that whatever the 
patentee has done to justify a broad claim to a group of chemicals, it isn’t enough.  It 
regularly reverses district courts that have found adequate support for the genus 
claim.  Not once but twice it has thrown out a multi-billion dollar jury verdict 
because it concluded the genus claim was invalid.8  In fact, we find only a       small 
minority of Federal Circuit decisions that have upheld a genus claim in the 
chemical industry in the past thirty years, and each of those has some idiosyncrasy 
that explains why it bucks the trend.9  That trend, as reflected in dozens of cases, is 
unmistakable: biotech, chemical, and pharmaceutical genus claims lose in court. 
 Patent lawyers and scholars don’t seem to have discovered this.  Patent 
lawyers write genus claims, the PTO grants them, and patent owners enforce them 
in court.  Lawyers and scholars sometimes lament individual decisions they 
                                                          
7 See Sean B. Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 729 (2019) 
(noting that genus claims are “ubiquitous” in these industries). 
8  See Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Centocor Ortho 
Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
9 See Part II.C. 
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disagree with.  But the whole system seems to proceed merrily along on the 
assumption that the role of genus claims in supporting these industries is secure.  It 
isn’t. 
   We argue that the death of genus claims is the result of some subtle but 
important doctrinal shifts, and that those changes reflect a misunderstanding of the 
purposes the law is supposed to serve.  The Federal Circuit has abandoned a 
practical focus on whether others could make use of the claimed invention in favor 
of a fruitless search for the exact boundaries of that invention.  This “full scope 
possession” theory invalidates a genus claim unless the patentee can show exactly 
which species within the genus will work as intended—an impossible task for a 
genus of any nontrivial size.  Given the importance of patents to these industries, 
and given the importance of genus claims to those patents, we find the death of 
genus claims in modern courts troubling.  If the doctrine continues going down this 
path, it may threaten innovation in an important sector of the economy. 
We think the law should go back to the way it was.  Genus claims should 
survive as long as other researchers can make effective use of the teaching of the 
patent to make and use chemicals within the genus without too much 
experimentation.  The validity of a claim should not depend on whether others can 
identify and test all of them.       
But the importance of our discovery isn’t limited to getting patent policy 
right. The death of genus claims is also an important lesson in how the law on the 
ground differs from the law on the books.  The fact that the industry proceeds 
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apace—investing in innovation, obtaining and enforcing patents—despite this 
surprising turn in the case law suggests that we may know less than we think we 
do about whether and how the patent system supports chemical innovation. 
 In Part I, we introduce the role of genus claims in chemical, pharmaceutical, 
and biotechnology patents and outline the traditional applications of § 112(a)’s 
requirements of enablement and written description to these claims.  In Part II, we 
discuss the validity of genus claims, documenting the striking trend to invalidate 
those claims in the past thirty years and the subtle doctrinal shifts that led to it.  
Finally, in Part III, we further examine this trend and discuss its implications for 
innovation in those industries and for what it says about the importance of patent 
doctrine more generally. 
I. Genus Claiming: The Traditional View 
A. Understanding Patent Claims 
Claims are central to every aspect of patent law.10 These are the numbered 
sentences at the end of the patent document that define the “technological territory” 
that the patentee claims is his or hers to control11 and set the scope of the exclusory 
                                                          
10 Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 
101 (2005); see also Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of 
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 
(1990) (stating that in patent law, “the name of the game is the claim”).  At the application 
stage the inventor “dicker[s] with the [PTO] to obtain an expansive exclusory right; and in 
litigation the parties try to convince the court to construe the claims in their favor.” Sean B. 
Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 128-29 
(2008). 
11 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990). 
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right conferred by the patent.12 The kinds of patent claims one encounters track the 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which sets forth “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” as patentable subject matter.13  At a high 
level, claims can refer to a structure, such a table or a chemical compound, or an 
activity, such as a process for manufacturing the table or a method of treating an 
illness with the compound. In the chemical and biochemical sciences, genus claims 
capture a group of related molecular structures.14  While chemical genus claims as 
such are composition (i.e., structure) claims, many claims we will encounter in this 
Article are actually method claims directed to an effective treatment of some 
condition or other uses of the molecules belonging to a chemical genus.15  
1. Claim Scope and the Disclosure Function of Patents  
The permissible scope of the claims is closely tied to the amount of 
information that the patentee discloses in the patent.  Put simply, the patentee 
must give more (information about the invention through disclosure) to get more 
(claim scope).16 This give and take lies at the heart of the U.S. patent system, which 
                                                          
12 Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). 
13 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”). 
14   See In re Kalm, 378 F.2d 959, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“When one speaks of a ‘genus’ in the 
chemical arts, one ordinarily speaks of a group of compounds closely related both in structure 
and properties.”). 
15 See generally Sean B. Seymore, Patenting New Uses for Old Inventions, 73 VAND. L. REV 
479 (2020) (discussing method of use patents). 
16 The noted patent lawyer and judge Giles Sutherland Rich captured the tradeoffs 
involving claim scope. See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 
35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 643 (1967) (“The stronger a patent the weaker it is and the 
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is essentially a bargain or quid pro quo between the patentee and society.17 The 
patentee gets the limited period of exclusivity conferred by the patent as set forth in 
the claims.  Society gets two things: (1) use of the invention once the patent term 
expires18 and (2) the disclosure, which furnishes technical information about the 
invention (i.e., how to make and use it) as soon as the patent document publishes.19 
The disclosure “add[s] to the sum of useful knowledge”20 and becomes a part of the 
                                                          
weaker a patent the stronger it is. To explain, a patent that is strong in that it contains 
broad claims which adequately protect the invention so they are hard to design around is 
weak in that it may be easier to invalidate and is therefore less likely to stand up in court 
because the claims are more likely to read on prior art or be broader than the disclosed 
invention. . . . On the other hand, the patent with narrow claims of the kind the Patent 
Office readily allows quickly without a contest is weak as protection and as incentive to 
invest but strong in that a court will not likely invalidate it.”) (emphasis in original). 
17 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a 
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new 
and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period 
of time.”). 
18 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to put the public in 
complete possession of the invention . . . so that interference with it may be avoided while 
the patent continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent 
expires.”). 
19 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 333 (2008) (“[I]t seems quite clear that dissemination, not just invention, 
of new information is one of the goals of the patent system.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do 
Patents Disclose Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 552-71 (2012) (exploring 
the technical value of patent disclosures).  Patent documents include issued patents and 
published patent applications.  Since 1999, most patent applications publish eighteen 
months after the earliest effective filing date.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012).  Once a 
patent application publishes, the information it discloses is considered publicly known.  See 
id. § 102. 
20 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974); cf. In re Argoudelis, 434 
F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full disclosure of 
how to make and use the invention “adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public 
storehouse”).  The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was a five-judge 
Article III appellate court on the same level as the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  The Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the CCPA.  See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  Soon after its creation, the Federal 
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technical literature.21 Patent theory posits that the disclosure will stimulate other 
researchers to improve upon the invention, design around it, and make wholly new 
inventions—all during the patent term—and also to use the invention as is after the 
patent’s expiration.22  Indeed, an oft-touted justification for the patent system is 
that society will get some benefit from the invention’s disclosure.23       
2. Enablement and the Sufficiency of Disclosure   
This bargain only works if the patent’s specification (the descriptive part of 
the patent document)24 provides sufficient technical information about the invention 
to enrich the public storehouse of knowledge.  Section 112(a) of the Patent Act 
strives to achieve this goal by mandating that the patent “shall contain a written 
                                                          
Circuit adopted CCPA decisional law as binding precedent.  See South Corp. v. United 
States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
21 Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 400 (1960).  Like 
technical journals, for example, patent disclosures can show the state of technology, set 
forth what others have already achieved, and provide technical information that others can 
avoid repeating.  Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 623-24 (2010). 
22 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481; see also Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of 
Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 264 (1994). 
23 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481 (explaining that the federal government “is willing to 
pay the high price” of exclusivity conferred by a patent for its disclosure, which, “it is 
assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances 
in the art”).  How effective those disclosures are in practice is a matter of dispute.  Compare 
Ouellette, supra, with Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
709 (2012).  But there is general agreement that the disclosure function works best in the 
chemical arts, where scientists have a shared language and the scope of patents is 
relatively clear. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE (2008). 
24 Courts, scholars, practitioners, and the PTO use the term “specification” to refer to the 
written description—the part of the patent document that provides descriptive (textual) 
details about the invention (e.g., “Background of the Invention,” “Summary of the 
Invention,” “Detailed Description of the Invention”).  CRAIG ALLEN NARD, PATENT LAW 47 
(5th ed. 2020).  This is done, in part, to avoid confusion with the “written description” 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).  See infra Part I.B.1.     
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description of the invention . . . as to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art 
[PHOSITA]25 . . . to make and use the same . . . .”26 This language provides the 
statutory basis for the enablement requirement, whose principal task is to 
safeguard the teaching function.27 As interpreted by the courts, the enablement 
requirement compels a patentee to furnish a disclosure sufficient to allow a 
PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation.28  
Enablement issues can arise in patent prosecution29 or litigation.30 In both 
contexts, “an enablement determination is made retrospectively, i.e., by looking back 
                                                          
25 The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent 
person in torts.  Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  
Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the 
sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the educational level 
of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the art, prior art 
solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innovations are made.  Envtl. 
Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
We use PHOSITA, not POSA, as one opinion recently declared it to be.  Idenix 
Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2019); cf. Joseph P. Meara, 
Note, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious 
Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002) (using the established term, PHOSITA).      
26 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). Note that prior to 2012, the relevant provision was codified as § 
112, first paragraph, rather than § 112(a). 
27 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 3-4 (explaining that enablement plays a central role 
in “safeguard[ing] the patent system’s disclosure function by ensuring relatively swift 
dissemination of technical information from which others . . . can learn”). 
28 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 
827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
29 The process of obtaining a patent—where the inventor or his or her agent or attorney 
files an application with the PTO—is called “patent prosecution.”  JANICE M. MUELLER, 
PATENT LAW 59 (5th ed. 2016).  In prosecution, the examiner must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claim in nonenabled.  Wright, 999 F.2d 
at 1561-62.      
30 An issued patent is presumed valid; therefore, a challenger has the burden of proving 
that a claim is invalid for a lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence.  Alcon 
Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014).      
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to the filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue 
experimentation would have been required to make and use the claimed invention 
at that time . . . .”31      The Federal Circuit set forth the relevant factors in In re 
Wands.32 They are: (1) the amount of direction or guidance presented in the 
disclosure, (2) the existence of working examples, (3) the nature of the invention, (4) 
the predictability or unpredictability of the art, (5) the PHOSITA’s level of skill, (6) 
the state of the prior art (preexisting knowledge and technology already available to 
the public),33 (7) the breadth of the claims, and (8) the quantity of experimentation 
necessary to practice the claimed invention.34   
The Wands factors show that how much a patent must teach to enable a 
patent claim depends on the nature of the technology.  Historically, there has been 
a natural dichotomy in enablement jurisprudence: the courts appeared to apply 
separate enablement standards for inventions in the predictable and unpredictable 
arts.35 In the predictable arts, which include mechanical and electrical engineering, 
a detailed disclosure has not been required because the inventions are rooted in 
                                                          
31 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999).      
32 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
33 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).  Documents (like issued patents 
and printed publications), devices, and activities are sources of prior art.  See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (2012). 
34 See Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
35 For a deeper discussion of the predictable-unpredictable dichotomy, see Seymore, 
Heightened Enablement, supra note 5, at 136-39; Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement 
Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282-84 (2008). 
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well-defined, predictable factors.36 If a claim recites a “fastener,” for instance, 
skilled artisans may well understand that a variety of different fasteners will work 
(nails, staples, glue, etc.) even if the patent itself doesn’t include much detail. By 
contrast, in the unpredictable arts, which include experimental fields like 
chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology, a detailed disclosure is required 
because PHOSITAs often cannot anticipate whether a reaction protocol that works 
for one embodiment of an invention37 will work for others.38 For example, in 
chemistry a PHOSITA often cannot take a result from one reaction and predict how 
similar compounds will react with a reasonable expectation of success.39 
                                                          
36 See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of 
disclosure for an invention involving predictable mechanical or electrical elements is less 
than that required for the unpredictable arts). 
37 An “embodiment” is a concrete, physical form of an invention described in a patent 
application or patent.  ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY 33 (7th ed. 2017). 
38 Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
11, 1997); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (noting “the high level of 
predictability in mechanical or electrical environments and the lower level of predictability 
expected in chemical reactions and physiological activity”).  Courts have long recognized the 
differences between something like a simple mechanical device and a chemical compound.  
See, e.g., Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868) (“Now a machine which consists 
of a combination of devices is the subject of invention, and its effects may be calculated a 
priori, while a discovery of a new substance by means of chemical combinations of known 
materials is empirical and discovered by experiment.”); Naylor v. Alsop Process Co., 168 F. 
911, 919 (8th Cir. 1909) (“It should also be borne in mind in considering this subject that 
reasoning by analogy in a complex field like chemistry is very much more restricted than in 
a simple field like mechanics.”). 
39 Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 5, at 144-46 (emphasizing that, in 
chemistry, the “array of chemical compounds which are structurally similar may differ 
radically in their properties”); cf. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (testing 
enablement by determining if a skilled scientist working with RNA viruses would have 
reasonably believed that the inventor’s success with the described embodiment(s) “could be 
extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success” to other embodiments encompassed 
by the claims). 
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Nevertheless, assuming an adequate teaching in the specification, inventors in this 
field could routinely obtain patent claims covering a group of structurally related 
chemicals.40 
3. The Commensurability Requirement   
A perennial enablement question is what breadth and depth of disclosure is 
sufficient to entitle a patentee to a broad genus claim that covers various ways of 
implementing the invention.  The basic premise and practical advantage of genus 
claims is that a detailed teaching involving one species can provide sufficient 
enablement for extrapolation across the entire scope of the claimed genus.  When it 
does, the patentee can satisfy enablement’s commensurability requirement without 
demonstrating that each and every embodiment of a genus claim works for the 
intended purpose.41 Claiming a genus allows the patentee to obtain rights to 
numerous structurally related species in the genus, including some that the 
patentee herself never thought of. 
How can a patent claim cover something the patentee never thought of?  The 
courts permit a PHOSITA to engage in “a reasonable amount of routine 
experimentation”42 to figure out the embodiments that work from those that do 
                                                          
40 See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.  
41 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (explaining that “the word ‘invention’ in 
the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical 
embodiment of that idea”); Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The mere 
fact that something has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis 
for rejecting all applications purporting to disclose how to do it.” (quoting In re Chilowsky, 
229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956))). 
42 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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not.43 The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)44 recognized that the 
alternative of requiring the patentee to identify and test every possible chemical in 
a genus would be unworkable: “the research to do this would evidently be 
endless.”45 This is known as the inoperative embodiments doctrine—a broad claim 
that covers unknown species is not necessarily invalid as long as some (perhaps 
most) of the subject matter works as described.46 Validity depends on the 
circumstances of each case—including the nature of the subject matter (predictable 
or unpredictable),47 the PHOSITA’s level of skill,48 and the number of inoperative 
embodiments.49 
                                                          
43 Id. (“We have held that a patent specification complies with the statute even if a 
‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed 
invention, but that such experimentation must not be ‘undue.’” (citing In re Wands, 858 
F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
44 The CCPA was a predecessor to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See 
supra note 12. 
45 In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1964); see also RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT 
CLAIMS § 214 (1949) (recognizing that in theory the only way that a chemist can determine 
if all species within a claimed genus will work as described is by testing “at least a majority 
of the members of that genus”).   
46 See In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Sarett, 327 F.2d at 1019 (noting that 
the mere inclusion of inoperative embodiments in a claim will not defeat patentability). 
47 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., Cook, 439 F.2d at 735 (noting that a broad claim that reads on a large number of 
inoperative embodiments is not necessarily invalid because a PHOSITA could figure out 
with minimal effort which of the unmade embodiments could work as intended).  Recall 
that the PHOSITA’s level of skill is a Wands factor.  See supra text accompanying note 23.   
49 See, e.g., Consol. Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (Incandescent Lamp Patent), 
159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (determining that the claim was invalid because most of the 
claimed embodiments were inoperable); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.  Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]f the number of inoperative [embodiments] 
becomes significant, and in effect forces [a PHOSITA] to experiment unduly in order to 
practice the claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid.”); Durel Corp. v. Osram 
Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining that if the accused 
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But how are we to know when the patentee has taught enough to justify a 
claim to a group of chemicals? The Supreme Court faced this issue long ago in the 
famous Incandescent Lamp Patent case.50  The patent-in-suit claimed a light bulb 
with a filament made of “carbonized fibrous or textile material.”51 While this broad 
claim covered every “carbonized fibrous or textile material” used as a filament, the 
specification only disclosed light bulbs using carbonized paper and wood carbon.52 
Thomas Edison, the accused infringer, found through laborious trial and error that 
bamboo worked well as a filament for incandescent light bulbs, but over six 
thousand other substances covered by the genus claim did not.53 The Supreme 
Court held that the patentee was entitled to a narrow claim for the carbonized 
paper embodiment, but not to the genus claim.54  
Incandescent Lamp demonstrates an outer limit on claim scope—the claims 
are limited by what the patent teaches.55 In Incandescent Lamp, the limited 
disclosure could not teach a PHOSITA how to find the embodiments that worked 
                                                          
infringer shows that a “significant percentage” of embodiments encompassed by the claims 
are inoperable, that might be sufficient to prove invalidity). 
50 Incandescent Lamp, 159 U.S. 465. 
51 Id. at 468. 
52 Id. at 472. 
53 Id. 
54 As Justice Brown wrote, “the fact that paper belongs to the fibrous kingdom did not 
invest [the patentees] with sovereignty over this entire kingdom.” Id. at 476. 
55 Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (noting that enablement’s purpose is to “ensure[] that the public knowledge is 
enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the 
claims”); see also O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (holding that Samuel 
Morse’s genus claim for all electronic communication made at a distance was “too broad, 
and not warranted by law”). 
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without undue experimentation.56 Indeed, in that case it was not obvious that there 
was any meaningful genus of “carbonized fibrous and textile materials” that could 
function as a light bulb filament.57  
Following Incandescent Lamp, in the 1928 case Corona Cord Tire Co. v. 
Dovan Chemical Corp., the Supreme Court invalidated a broad genus claim to a 
class of chemicals because the patentee had not shown that there was “any general 
quality common to disubstituted guanidines which made them all effective” for use 
in the process of the invention.58 Here too there was evidence that a substantial 
number of the claimed embodiments did not work.59 These cases show that 
providing a limited number of species in the specification cannot serve as a 
“springboard” for claiming a genus if those species are not representative of the 
entire genus.60 Again, the patentee must give more (disclosure) to get more (scope). 
B. The Traditional Role of Genus Claims 
                                                          
56 To be sure, under modern enablement doctrine a court would invalidate the genus claim 
after concluding that undue experimentation would be required to practice the full scope of 
the genus claim.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  The relevant Wands factors 
would be the amount of guidance presented in the disclosure (which was limited), the 
existence of working examples (only one provided), the breadth of the claims (very large), 
and the quantity of experimentation required (substantial, as shown by Edison).  See supra 
note 23 and accompanying text (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
57 See infra Part III. 
58 Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 385 (1928); cf. Incandescent 
Lamp, 159 U.S. at 472 (“If the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile substances a 
quality common to them all, or to them generally . . . and such quality or characteristic 
adapted them peculiarly to incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too 
broad . . . .”). 
59 See Corona Cord, 276 U.S. at 385 (“[T]he experts show that there are between fifty and 
one hundred substances which answer this description, of which there is quite a number 
that are not accelerators at all.”). 
60 Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Carborundum Co., 155 F.2d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1946). 
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Genus claims provide the broadest scope of patent protection.  These broad 
claims use functional language61 or generic formulas to cover embodiments of the 
invention (species) that share a common attribute or property.62 For example, 
consider a claim to a plastic-coated steel screw.  Given that there are many different 
plastics (e.g., nylon, polystyrene, polypropylene, polyvinyl chloride), the genus claim 
encompasses many species.   
Patentees opt for genus claims for two reasons.  First, since patent law does 
not require an inventor to actually make each species claimed,63 genus claims can 
afford broad scope with relatively little experimentation.64 Second, genus claims 
prevent competitors from capturing the benefit of an invention (perhaps by making 
a minor variation to a molecule or changing the plastic used to make the screw)65 
because an unauthorized use of any species within the scope of the claimed genus is 
an act of patent infringement.66   
                                                          
61 Functional language describes an invention by what it does rather than by what it is.  In 
re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (sanctioning the use of functional claiming 
and recognizing that it can be a “practical necessity”). 
62 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008).  Lefstin argues that most claims are genus claims.  
For example, a claim reciting “a chair with four legs” would cover “chairs of all sorts of 
materials, chairs of all sizes, chairs including contoured backrests, and chairs with roller 
wheels, etc.” so long as they possess four legs.  Id. at 1169-70. 
63 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
64 See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 5, at 145-54; Seymore, Teaching 
Function, supra note 13, at 628-32. 
65 When patentees draft narrow claims, an imitator would find a minor variation over the 
claimed embodiments; thereby rendering the patent useless.  See Merges & Nelson, supra 
note 6, at 845. 
66 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
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Although genus claims appear in all areas of technology, they are ubiquitous 
in chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology—the aforementioned 
unpredictable arts.67 A common claiming technique is to draw a core generic 
chemical structure with an array of variables appended to it—which can each 
represent numerous chemical moieties. For example, the representative claim at 
issue in Idenix Pharmaceuticals v. Gilead Sciences, the case to which we will return 
in Part II,68 involved a claim to a five-membered ring structure with “wild cards” on 
the periphery of the ring represented by the numbered “R” groups (see below). This 
traditional manner of chemical genus claiming can allow for a variety of 
permutations, and therefore a large number of species, within the scope of the 
claim. Genus claims are pervasive in the unpredictable arts and have received 
considerable treatment in treatises,69 books,70 and voluminous case law.71  
                                                          
67 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
68 Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).       
69 See, e.g., EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 5090 (2d ed. 1952); ROBERT 
D. FIER, CHEMICAL PATENT PRACTICE (1975). 
70 See, e.g., JOSEPH ROSSMAN, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR CHEMISTS (1932); EDWARD 
THOMAS, CHEMICAL INVENTIONS AND CHEMICAL PATENTS (1950); JOHN T. MAYNARD, 
UNDERSTANDING CHEMICAL PATENTS: A GUIDE FOR THE INVENTOR (1978). 
71 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 59; infra notes 67-72. In addition, chemical claims can be 
drafted in a so-called “Markush group” form. See Ex parte Markush, 1925 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 
126, 128, 340 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 839 (1924); In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 
1977) (sanctioning the practice); In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 719-20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) 
(explaining the history and current law of Markush practice).  
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 How much must a patentee teach to enable a genus claim in unpredictable 
fields? The early chemical cases were somewhat stringent.  For instance, in the 
1957 case In re Shokal,72 the CCPA adopted the view that disclosure of “a single 
species can rarely, if ever, afford sufficient support for a generic claim.”73 By 1960, 
the CCPA had moved away from Shokal and took the view that it is “manifestly 
impracticable” to require a detailed teaching “of every species falling within [a 
genus], or even to name every such species.”74 The amount of teaching required to 
enable a genus claim “will vary depending on the circumstances of particular 
                                                          
72 In re Shokal, 242 F.2d 771 (C.C.P.A. 1957).  
73 Id. at 773. To be sure, this early case law somewhat conflated the concepts that are today 
understood to be embodied in separate requirements under § 112(a)—enablement and 
written description. See, e.g., In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 625 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (cited in Shokal, 
242 F.3d at 773) (holding that a single working example with fluoride could not support the 
four-member genus of halogens). In Soll, the CCPA did not make clear whether the genus 
failed because the patent did not teach a PHOSITA how to make and use the full scope of 
the genus, or because the failure to name more than one species in the specification 
indicated a lack of “possession” of the genus. See id. For more on written description and 
possession, see infra Part I.C.1. 
74 In re Grimme, 274 F.2d 949, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960).  With respect to naming every species 
within a genus, recall the illustration presented above where the patentee claimed “a 
plastic-coated steel screw.” Even if the disclosure only names or exemplifies a handful of 
species (e.g., polystyrene, polyethylene, etc.), it could enable other plastics that are not 
specifically recited (including plastics that did not exist at the time of filing).   
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cases.”75 This liberalization opened the door for patentees in unpredictable fields to 
obtain broader genus claims with only a handful of working examples,76 or even no 
working examples, if the disclosure provided sufficient teaching.77  
A pivotal case illustrating this shift is In re Angstadt.78 The genus claim at 
issue, which encompassed thousands of species, was directed to a method for 
catalytically transforming a class of organic compounds.  Although the applicant 
disclosed forty examples in the specification, the PTO’s position was that the 
disclosure left “too much to conjecture, speculation, and experimentation” and was 
nonenabling because: (1) the forty examples did not teach across (and were not 
representative of) the entire genus and (2) the disclosure did not set forth those 
catalyst features that would allow a PHOSITA to produce materials with the 
                                                          
75 In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357, 360 (C.C.P.A. 1960); see also In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d      
904, 910 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that there is “no magical relation” between the number 
of working examples disclosed and claim breadth); Ex Parte Sloane, 22 U.S.P.Q. 222, 1934 
WL 25325, at *2 (P.O.B.A. 1934) (“While the number of specific substances mentioned is 
doubtless important, especially in a case where the generic nature of a case must be 
inferred from the mention of specific substances, we do not think that a proper 
determination of the breadth of disclosure can be made solely from a consideration of the 
specific examples given. If the disclosure, taken as a whole, is generic, an applicant is 
entitled to generic claims if they are otherwise allowable.”).  
76 Working examples are embodiments of the invention that have been made or performed 
that show that the invention can really achieve the intended result.  Sean B. Seymore, 
Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1528 (2011). 
77 See In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232-34 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (upholding a genus claim 
covering methods for removing chemicals from blood because the disclosure was sufficiently 
detailed and the PHOSITA’s level of skill was high, even though no working examples had 
been provided); see also Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 908 (explaining that there is no statutory 
basis for a working example requirement). The Supreme Court long ago allowed this 
practice in a famous case. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535-36 (1888).  
78 In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
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intended function.79 The CCPA reversed the enablement rejection, explaining that 
requiring a more detailed disclosure “would force an inventor seeking adequate 
patent protection to carry out a prohibitive number of actual experiments,”80 which 
would “tend to discourage inventors from filing patent applications in an 
unpredictable area since the patent claims would have to be limited to those 
embodiments which are expressly disclosed.”81 Thus, the broad genus claim was 
enabled, even if the PHOSITA had to engage in some experiments to figure out 
which catalyst candidates worked and which did not82—so long as the inventor 
demonstrated that some species do actually function as intended and provided 
direction for how to test the rest.83  Angstadt aligns with the inoperative 
embodiments doctrine discussed above.84 
Early Federal Circuit opinions continued to resist enablement challenges to 
broad genus claims.  Consider Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 
where the patent-at-issue involved emulsions useful as blasting agents for mining 
and construction.85 The genus claim covered various salts, fuels, and emulsifiers 
that could form thousands of emulsions.86 The accused infringer argued that the 
                                                          
79 Id. at 501-02. 
80 Id. at 502-03. 
81 Id. at 503. 
82 Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 5, at 149. 
83 Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 503. 
84 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
85 Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
86 Id. at 1576. 
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genus claim was nonenabled because the specification did not teach which 
combinations would work and thus was nothing more than “a list of candidate 
ingredients.”87 There was also record evidence that a considerable number of the 
claimed combinations were inoperative.88 The accused infringer argued that this 
supposed lack of commensurability between the disclosure and the genus claim 
would require the PHOSITA to experiment unduly to find an operable emulsion.  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that “[i]t is not a function of the claims to 
specifically exclude . . . possible inoperative substances . . . .”89 A detailed teaching 
was unnecessary because a PHOSITA could readily select the proper ingredients 
using a “basic principle of emulsion chemistry.”90 Angstadt and Atlas Powder show 
that the courts would permit patentees to rely extensively on the PHOSITA’s 
knowledge to provide enabling support for broad genus claims. 
With that understanding, genus claims make complete sense. A patentee can 
claim a structural group of chemicals with an invariant backbone and variance of 
the groups attached to that core.  As numerous prosecution handbooks confirm, this 
is the typical kind of chemical genus claim that patent attorneys are taught to 
                                                          
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 1577. 
89 Id. at 1576 (citing In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858-59 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); see also In 
re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that there is “nothing wrong” with 
genus claims that encompass “vast numbers of inoperative embodiments” as long as the 
PHOSITA can figure out what works and what does not work).  But there seems to be an 
upper limit on the amount of inoperability that will be tolerated.  See Atlas Powder, 750 
F.2d at 1576-77 (“[I]f the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in 
effect forces one of ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the 
claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid.”). 
90 Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1576. 
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draft.91  Some of those variants will work; others won’t.  But the inventor of a genus 
can claim that genus as long as there is enough information that the PHOSITA can 
figure out some species within the genus that will work and how to make those 
species without too much effort.  The prevalence of advice for such claiming reflects 
a widespread understanding that they are valid. 
C. Portents of Change 
1. The Written Description Requirement 
Section 112(a) of the Patent Act states that the patent’s specification “shall 
contain a written description of the invention . . . in sufficiently full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable a [PHOSITA] . . . to make and use the same . . . .”92 As 
noted above, this language provides the statutory basis for the enablement 
requirement.93 However, in the 1967 case In re Ruschig, the CCPA held that this 
language embodies an additional disclosure requirement: the “written description” 
requirement.94 The issue is whether the specification, as of the filing date sought, 
conveys with reasonable clarity that the patentee “actually invented” the claimed 
subject matter.95 The requirement is met if the claimed subject matter is supported 
by an adequate description in the specification.96 
                                                          
91   See, e.g., CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE TO 
PATENT LAW 7-8 & n.4 (2010); see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
92 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012), discussed supra Part I.A.2. 
93 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
94 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995-96 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
95 Id. at 995. 
96 Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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How does the written description requirement differ from enablement?  In 
the 1971 chemical case In re DiLeone, the CCPA explained that one can “enable the 
practice of an invention as broadly as it is claimed, and still not describe that 
invention.”97 DiLeone provides an illustration: “[C]onsider the case where the 
specification discusses only compound A and contains no broadening language of 
any kind. This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use 
compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has not been described.”98 
The converse is also true.99   
While they are separate requirements, both enablement and written 
description share a policy objective: to prevent overreaching (and thus limit what 
can be patented) by requiring a correspondence between that is disclosed and what 
is claimed.100 Enablement compels the patentee to teach a PHOSITA how to make 
and use an invention as broadly as it is claimed without undue experimentation;101 
written description requires the patentee to describe the invention in sufficient 
detail to allow a PHOSITA to recognize that the inventor actually invented what is 
                                                          
97 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (emphases added). 
98 Id. at 1405 n.1 (emphases in original). 
99 In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676, 677 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Although appellant’s specification 
describes the invention as broadly as it is claimed, thereby eliminating any issue 
concerning the description requirement, a specification which ‘describes’ does not 
necessarily also ‘enable’ [a PHOSITA] to make or use the claimed invention.” (citation 
omitted)). 
100 See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561 (noting that the written description requirement guards 
against overreaching). 
101 In re Vaeck, 947 F,2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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claimed.102 But to meet the written description requirement—for genus claims as 
for any others— it was traditionally sufficient for the patentee to simply mention 
the genus in the specification or among the originally filed claims.103 In addition, as 
DiLeone suggests, listing some species belonging to the genus in the specification, 
along with some broadening language, might also have been enough to adequately 
describe a genus claim.104 
Indeed, early on, the written description requirement came into play only in 
two scenarios, both involving the problem of timing: (1) when claims not presented 
in the original patent application were amended or added to that application during 
prosecution;105 or (2) when the inventor sought the benefit of the filing date of the 
original patent application for claims of a later-filed, co-pending application (known 
as a “continuation” application).106 The key question common to these two scenarios 
                                                          
102 Cf. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he description must clearly 
allow [a PHOSITA] to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”).  Descriptive 
means include “words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the 
claimed invention.”  Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
103 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc) (discussing this case law). 
104 DiLeone, 436 F.2d at 1405 n.1. 
105 Id. at 1560.  
106 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560.  A continuation application is a second application for the 
same invention disclosed in a parent (original) application that is filed before the parent 
application either issues as a patent or becomes abandoned.  35 U.S.C. § 120.  It has the 
identical specification as the parent and enjoys the benefit of the parent’s earlier filing date.  
Id. Applicants file continuation applications for many reasons.  For example, an applicant 
may decide to prosecute a parent application with narrow claims (which will issue 
relatively quickly) and then prosecute broader claims in the continuation application.  See 
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 161-62 (4th ed. 2006). 
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is whether the specification provides “adequate support” for any claim that did not 
appear in the patent application at the time of filing.107 As stated by the CCPA, 
“[t]he function of the description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had 
possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject 
matter later claimed by him.”108 Early Federal Circuit cases agreed, noting that the 
“purpose and applicability” of the written description requirement was “where the 
claim at issue was filed subsequent to the filing of the application.”109   
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical.  The inventor files a patent 
application claiming “a stainless steel rake having a hardwood handle.” The 
specification discloses numerous species of hardwoods; including beech, hickory, 
maple, oak, and walnut.  It also explains how to make and use the rake.  While the 
application is pending at the PTO, the inventor seeks to amend the application by 
adding a genus claim that recites “a stainless steel rake having a wooden handle.”110 
Note that this claim comprises a larger genus because “wood” is broader than 
“hardwood.” Enablement isn’t an issue because rake-making is a predictable 
                                                          
107 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560. 
108 In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (emphasis added). 
109 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1562 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 
(C.C.P.A. 1978)); see also Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (explaining that, in the context of claiming entitlement to the priority date of an 
earlier application, the written description requirement is met if “the disclosure of the 
application relied upon reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession 
at that time of the later claimed subject matter”). 
110 Applicants broaden claims during prosecution for a variety of reasons, including a desire 
to ensnare a competitor’s product.  See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 
1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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technology.111 But unfortunately for the inventor, the specification only describes 
and exemplifies hardwoods.  Accordingly, as the Federal Circuit held in Gentry 
Gallery v. Berkline Corp., the PTO will deny the amendment (or a court will 
invalidate the claims) for a lack of written description because “[the] original 
disclosure serves to limit the permissible breadth of the later-drafted claims.”112  
In sum, the traditional role of written description was to act as “a timing 
mechanism to ensure fair play in the presentation of claims after the original filing 
date and to guard against manipulation of the process by the patent 
applicant.”113As of the 1980s, then, written description was a separate requirement 
from enablement, but it was one that was limited to the timing of claims and thus 
designed to prevent what we might call “late claiming”—obtaining a claim based on 
later knowledge or realization, but trying to get the benefit of an earlier filing 
date.114 This form of written description, however, did not pose a threat to genus 
claims unless such claims were added after filing and the specification included no 
indication that the inventors believed that their invention was generic.115 
2. The Rise and Nature of Biotech Inventions  
                                                          
111 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
112 Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479. 
113 Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 638 (2002) (quoted in PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
114 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that the written description requirement focuses on preventing a patentee from 
later “asserting that he invented that which he did not”). 
115 See, e.g., In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
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The requirements of enablement and written description come up frequently 
in biotechnology patent cases, and many of the cases we discuss limiting genus 
claims come from biotechnology.  During the 1980s the Federal Circuit routinely 
upheld genus claims in the biotechnology field against § 112(a) challenges.  Two 
seminal cases during this era involved so-called “monoclonal antibodies.”116 In 
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., the genus claim covered a so-called 
“immunoassay” method employing highly-sensitive monoclonal antibodies to 
determine the presence or concentration of an antigen.117 In this infringement 
litigation, the defendant asserted that the patent was invalid for nonenablement 
because the specification failed to disclose either how to make monoclonal 
antibodies or how to screen them to achieve the claimed sensitivity.118 The Federal 
Circuit rejected both arguments, noting that the synthetic and screening techniques 
were well known in the art and the absence of “a shred of evidence that undue 
experimentation was required by [a PHOSITA] to practice the invention.”119 The 
                                                          
116 Monoclonal antibodies are man-made proteins designed to find and attach to specific 
antigens (e.g., viruses, bacteria) circulating throughout the body.  Once attached, they can 
force the immune system to destroy cells containing the antigen.  The term “monoclonal” 
means that the man-made antibody is synthesized by clones from a single parent immune 
cell.  Monoclonal antibodies are used extensively in R&D and as treatments for various 
diseases, infections, and cancer.  See RICHARD COICO & GEOFFREY SUNSHINE, 
IMMUNOLOGY: A SHORT COURSE 80-81 (2015). 
117 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
“Sensitivity” is the ability of an antibody to detect and bind to a particular antigen.  Id. at 
1369. 
118 Id. at 1384. 
119 Id. 
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court famously stated that “a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is 
well known in the art.”120 
In In re Wands, the genus claim covered an immunoassay method employing 
highly-sensitive monoclonal antibodies capable of detecting a hepatitis-B antigen 
using a highly-sensitive monoclonal antibody.121 The issue was whether the 
disclosure enabled practicing the genus claim without undue experimentation.122 In 
order to make the subject matter of the invention, a PHOSITA would have to 
engage in an extensive amount of experimentation that included isolating and 
cloning specialized cells, culturing them, testing the antibodies they produced to 
determine which would bind to the hepatitis B antigen, and further screening to 
select those with the claimed sensitivity.123 Applying the aforementioned Wands 
factors,124 the court determined that the claim was enabled because the 
specification gave considerable direction and guidance; working examples were 
provided; the PHOSITA’s level of skill was high; and all of the required methods 
were well known in the art.125 Enablement was not precluded if extensive, routine 
                                                          
120 Id. (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 
1452, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). But cf. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the patentee cannot rely heavily on PHOSITA 
knowledge outside the specification to enable the claim). 
121 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
122 Id. at 735. 
123 Id. at 737-78. 
124 See supra text accompanying note 26 (citing Wands, 858 F.2d at 737). 
125 Wands, 858 F.2d at 740. 
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experimentation is needed to practice the invention because “the key word is 
‘undue,’ not ‘experimentation.’”126 
For the Federal Circuit in the 1980s, then, biotechnology was a new 
technology, but it didn’t call for new legal doctrines. The enablement question was 
the same as it had been with any other field of science—can the PHOSITA figure 
out how to make and use species within a claimed genus without too much work or 
too many false starts?—and the written description requirement continued to be 
limited to the problem of lack of specification support for claims added after 
filing.127 
But all that was about to change. 
II. The Modern Era: Genus Claims Fail in Court 
The courts’ initially favorable response to biotech patents helped to spur 
research and development in this industry and to bring forth groundbreaking, 
commercially significant inventions.128 But the trend soon began to reverse. 
Beginning in the 1990s,129 defendants in biotech and even traditional chemistry 
cases began to turn to § 112(a) as a critical shield, putting pressure on this 
                                                          
126 Id. at 737 (quoting In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
127 See, e.g., In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
128 For another significant example of a pro-biotech decision involving a different section of 
the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101, see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303(1980). 
129 See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See 
generally Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written 
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000). 
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provision’s functions of policing claim overbreadth and early patenting.130 The 
strategy bore fruit, as the Federal Circuit increasingly came to rely on the 
enablement requirement, and then also on a powerful new variant of the written 
description requirement, to strike down generic patent claims in the life science 
fields.   
Karshtedt observed ten years ago that the court’s enablement and written 
description opinions in the 1990s and 2000s “have shown discomfort with broad 
claims of biotechnology.”131 In this Article, we show that the Federal Circuit 
extended this trend to traditional chemistry genus claims in the 2010s—and has 
frequently done so in ways that disserves the purposes of § 112(a) doctrine. 
Successful recent lines of attack by patent challengers include arguments pointing 
out inadequate guidance for how the patent specification’s teachings would 
translate across the genus’s full scope132 and an excessive amount of 
experimentation needed to identify potentially inoperative claim embodiments.133 
and the lack of precise structural information about the bounds of the genus.134 
While some prior precedent exists for these routes of invalidating patents for 
                                                          
130 See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 5; Karen S. Canady, Note & Comment, 
The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1994). 
131   Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and 
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. 
L.J. 109, 154 (2011). 
132 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
133 Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
134 Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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inadequate disclosure,135 their deployment has become significantly more vigorous 
over time.  
The resulting shift is dramatic, as we show in this Part.  Especially in the 
1980s, one is hard pressed to find appellate cases invalidating claims under § 112(a) 
based on notions of claim overbreadth.136 By contrast, in the past thirty years, there 
are virtually no significant examples of genus claims in the life science fields upheld 
on appeal as compliant with § 112(a) outside the unique context of so-called 
“interference” proceedings. The Federal Circuit’s shift in its approaches to genus 
claims and the regularity with which those claims are now struck down reflect a 
fundamental—and previously unnoticed—change in patent doctrine.   
A.   Rejecting Claims on Enablement Grounds 
1.    The antecedents of doctrinal drift  
The tightening of § 112(a) began in early 1990s. A significant early case in 
this line is Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,137 in which both parties’ 
                                                          
135 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Rainer, 390 F.2d 771 (C.C.P.A. 
1968). Cf. generally Kevin T. Richards, Note, Experimentation and Patent Validity: 
Restoring the Supreme Court’s Incandescent Lamp Patent Precedent, 101 VA. L. REV. 1545, 
1575-76 (2015) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent supports an enablement standard 
that is less patent-friendly than Wands).  
136 For typical examples of § 112(a) failures from the 1980s, see Quaker City Gear Works, 
Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming the judgment of nonenablement 
where matter critical for practicing the claimed invention was incorporated by reference 
from an unavailable publication); In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming a 
written description rejection of claims to subject matter not disclosed in the original 
patent); White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (holding claims nonenabled where technology to practice invention was kept as trade 
secret).  
137   Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  
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patents had claims relating to gene-mediated synthesis of a protein called 
erythropoietin (EPO) invalidated for lack of enablement. EPO is a hormone that 
“stimulates the production of red blood cells” and is therefore valuable in the 
treatment of “anemias or blood disorders characterized by low or defective bone 
marrow production of red blood cells.”138 Given the prevalence of these disorders, 
isolated EPO has been a highly sought-after therapeutic, and the litigation was a 
hard-fought battle between U.S. and Japanese biotech giants competing in this 
space. While Chugai’s claims were invalidated based on the evidence that the 
method in the specification did not actually produce the EPO with the claimed 
activity, a fairly uncontroversial application of the enablement requirement,139 
Amgen did actually teach how to make EPO. 
Nonetheless, Amgen ran into an overbreadth-based enablement challenge. 
Amgen’s representative claim was directed to a genus of deoxyribonucleic acids 
(DNAs)—molecules of life known more commonly as genes140—as defined by their 
function of producing EPO and its analogs: “A purified and isolated DNA sequence . 
. . encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of 
that of [EPO] to allow possession of the biological property of causing bone marrow 
                                                          
138 Id. at 1203.       
139 Id. at 1215-17.      
140 If this case were decided today, the claims would have been invalid for the separate 
reason that isolated genomic DNA is not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
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cells to increase production of . . . red blood cells, and to increase hemoglobin 
synthesis or iron uptake.”141 
The Federal Circuit noted that this claim encompasses a “potentially 
enormous” number of isolated DNA sequences.142 Any gene that “encodes,” or causes 
the production of, EPO or “EPO-like products”—proteins with a structure similar 
enough to EPO to generate red blood cells—would be covered by this claim.143 The 
court acknowledged that “a patent applicant is entitled to claim his invention 
generically” when the claims “are of a scope appropriate to the invention 
disclosed.”144 But it explained that the specification of Amgen’s patent had “little 
enabling disclosure” of the potential DNA variants encoding EPO, or of “how to 
make them.”145 After further flagging “the manifold possibilities for change in [the 
claimed] structure, with attendant uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed 
by these analogs,”146 the Federal Circuit concluded that “[i]t is not sufficient, having 
made the gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly 
ascertained, to claim all possible genetic sequences that have EPO-like activity.”147 
                                                          
141   Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204. 
142 Id. at 1213.      
143 Note this functional aspect of the claim. As we discuss below, this is a hallmark of claims 
that the Federal Circuit properly invalidated under § 112(a), but the court’s doctrinal path 
has also endangered claims that we believe to be deserving. See infra. 
144   Id. at 1213-14. 
145   Id. at 1213. 
146 Id. at 1214.      
147   Id. 
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Amgen’s claims thus presented a commensurability problem.148 Indeed, 
because the specification disclosed only a few examples of a large and complex 
genus of DNAs whose varied structures could unpredictably affect their EPO-
producing function, the Federal Circuit did not even formally consider the Wands 
factors and readily reached the conclusion of nonenablement.149 Still, the attitude of 
the opinion differs markedly from the CCPA’s In re Angstadt decision.150 That court, 
one will recall,151 upheld a rather broad claim against a nonenablement challenge in 
part because, rather than in spite of, identifying working embodiments within the 
claims’ scope required “the types and amount of experimentation which the 
uncertainty of [the] art makes inevitable.”152 In so doing, the CCPA rewarded a 
significant discovery in the unpredictable field of chemistry with a meaningful 
protection of a broad genus claim.153 
To be sure, distinctions between Angstadt and Amgen are possible. The 
Angstadt claims were in the well-established field of chemical catalysis that, to 
channel the immortal words of Donald Rumsfeld, brought with it “known 
unknowns”—an evocative version of the CCPA’s nod to the inevitable but acceptable 
                                                          
148 See supra Part I.A.3. 
149 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213.      
150 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).       
151 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
152 Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504; cf. In re Wands, 585 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining 
that some areas of science require laborious experimentation to practice inventions in spite 
of “a high level of skill in the art”). 
153 Cf. Canady, supra note 131 (noting that in certain fields of technology, extensive 
experimentation is inevitable).      
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uncertainty involved in practicing Angstadt’s invention. In contrast, Amgen dealt 
with the field of recombinant DNA technology that was just emerging when the 
applications that matured into the patents-in-suit were filed, bringing with it many 
“unknown unknowns.”154 In addition, and in further contrast to Angstadt, Amgen’s 
claims were largely defined by the function of EPO-like activity and did not include 
much in the way of actual structure.155  The Amgen court, however, did not attempt 
to distinguish Angstadt.156 As we show in this section, the Federal Circuit’s failure 
to square Angstadt with its later § 112(a) case law has led to instability and, 
ultimately, a marked doctrinal drift. Any broad genus claim, not just one in an 
emerging field, would soon become vulnerable. 
In addition to the Federal Circuit’s increased scrutiny of claim overbreadth, 
groundwork for change was created by the court’s subtle but significant recasting of 
what sorts of experimentation can be considered undue under the Wands standard. 
This shift arguably began in a 1999 Federal Circuit biotech enablement opinion, 
Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, Inc.157 This case involved so-called “antisense” technology 
that, as the court held, was also claimed in a plainly overbroad manner.158 Briefly, 
                                                          
154 For an example in which the nascent nature of the field led to the conclusion of 
nonenablement, see Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (similar in 
the context of the written description requirement); Seymore, Heightened Enablement, 
supra note 5.      
155  Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1204, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
156 Id. at 1213 (citing Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 502, but only for the for the innocuous proposition 
that “it is not necessary that a patent applicant test all the embodiments of his invention”).       
157  Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
158 Id. at 1368, 1377. 
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antisense is a method for regulating the gene-mediated production of proteins with 
the aid of synthetic DNA molecules.159 This technology embodies a powerful method 
of controlling the body’s immune response, and has therefore paved the way for 
therapies that can treat inflammations and various autoimmune disorders. The 
claims were drawn to antisense-promoting synthetic DNAs “present in a 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic cell containing a gene” and prokaryotic or eukaryotic 
cells containing those DNAs.160 The inventors got the antisense technology to work 
in some genes in E. Coli., disclosed those methods in the specification, and asserted 
that antisense was generalizable to other genes and organisms, including 
eukaryotes.161 
The Federal Circuit found that all the factors pointed towards 
nonenablement: the claims were broad; the technology, nascent and unpredictable; 
and the experimentation needed to practice it, especially in eukaryotes, challenging 
and rife with failure.162 As to the direction in the specification and working 
examples, the Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that the 
patents “provided little guidance . . . as to the practice of antisense in cells other 
                                                          
159  An example of this so-called “gene expression” is production of EPO mediated by the 
EPO genes, discussed above in the context of the Amgen case. 
160 Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1368. Prokaryotes are lower organisms such as the well-known E. Coli 
bacteria, while eukaryotes are higher organisms like animals and plants. Id. at 1366 n.2.      
161   Id. at 1368. The defendant’s product was a tomato, which is eukaryotic. Id. at 1377. 
162 Id. at 1370-75.      
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than E. coli, and that such minimal disclosure as there was constituted no more 
than a plan or invitation to practice antisense in those cells.”163  
But the court didn’t stop there. A point implied in passing in Enzo—arguably 
dictum because experimentation needed to practice the claimed invention was 
shown to be anything but routine—was that even routine experimentation can 
sometimes be “undue” within the Wands framework if it is too extensive.164 This 
seemingly insignificant, almost throwaway, language has nonetheless been used to 
great effect in recent enablement cases.165 The Federal Circuit affirmatively 
restated Enzo’s “routine” notion in ALZA Corp. v. Andrix Pharmaceuticals,166 
decided in 2010, when it observed that “[e]nablement is not precluded where a 
‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required to practice a claimed 
invention, however, [sic] such experimentation must not be ‘undue.’”167 Although 
ALZA itself did not deal with a generically claimed invention, a series of subsequent 
Federal Circuit decisions striking down chemical genus claims made much use of 
the “routine but undue” argument.168 This theory further paved the way for 
invalidating claims directed to technologies that, unlike recombinant DNA or 
                                                          
163   Id. at 1375. 
164 Id. at 1370.      
165 Cf. Matthew D. Kellam, Comment, Making Sense Out of Antisense: The Enablement 
Requirement in Biotechnology After Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 76 IND. L.J. 221, 227 (2001) 
(“Avoiding trial and error experiments and unpredictable results in this field is impossible.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Canady, supra note 131.      
166   ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
167   Id. at 940 (citations omitted). 
168   See infra Part II.A.2. 
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antisense, were not nascent or emerging, but arguably unpredictable only in the 
“known unknowns” context that the CCPA previously found acceptable in cases like 
Angstadt and Atlas Powder.169 
2.    The new law of genus claim nonenablement 
Of late, § 112(a) began to be applied with increasing rigor against patents in 
areas with “known unknowns.”  The first opinion in this latest line of cases, Wyeth 
& Cordis v. Abbott,170 involved a traditional chemical genus rather than a biotech 
invention. The underlying discovery addressed a condition called restenosis, which 
is the narrowing of arteries that can take place when a catheter is inserted to clear 
out plaque,171 and the claims recited a method of treating it with a therapeutically 
effective amount of a chemical belonging to the class of compounds called 
“rapamycin.”172 The rapamycin compounds all have a particular “macrocyclic” (i.e., 
large-ring) structure, but one of the chemical groups attached to the ring is allowed 
to vary. The inventors thus claimed the class of potential therapeutic agents much 
as one would a traditional chemical genus. While many such claims are directed to 
                                                          
169 See supra; cf. In re Mazrocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“In the field of 
chemistry generally, there may be times when the well-known unpredictability of chemical 
reactions will alone be enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a 
particular broad statement put forward as enabling support for a claim. This will especially 
be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted scientific 
principles.”). This older view thus holds that claims fail enablement if the underlying 
subject matter cannot be made at all because it does not work, and a genus was therefore 
not really invented. That is very different than saying it is routine but time-consuming to 
figure out all the operable species in the genus.           
170   Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
171  Id. at 1382.      
172 Id. 
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a structure with an invariant chemical core and a wild-card substituent 
denominated as “R,” “X,” or some other indicator of a variable chemical group,173 the 
patentee simply used the word “rapamycin” to convey both the core and the 
substituent concepts (see below—the group in the dashed oval is allowed to vary).174 
 
The specification demonstrated that at least one of the species within the 
rapamycin genus, “sirolimus,” was effective in treating restenosis.175 It also 
disclosed assays for testing if other rapamycins have the requisite therapeutic 
property,176 and an expert explained that the substituent group must be below a 
certain molecular weight in order to have an antirestenotic function.177 But all this 
was not enough. After noting that even routine experimentation “is not ‘without 
                                                          
173 See supra Part I.B. 
174   Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1383. 
175 Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1384.      
176 Id.      
177   Id. 
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bounds’” for the purpose of the undue experimentation standard,178 the Federal 
Circuit cited ALZA for the proposition that the need for “an iterative, trial-and-error 
process to practice the claimed invention even with the help of the . . . specification” 
can lead to an enablement problem and invalidated the claims.179 The court 
explained that the synthesis of the “tens of thousands of candidate[]” sirolimus 
compounds was laborious, the assays were time-consuming,180 and the guidance on 
structural parameters that could help a PHOSITA identify working species within 
the claimed genus and thus accomplish this work more quickly was inadequate.181  
The genus in Wyeth is reasonably large. Nevertheless, the problem in Wyeth 
is one of “known unknowns.”  Identifying antirestenotic members of the rapamycin 
genus may have been time-consuming, but it was solvable with the aid of 
established techniques of organic synthesis and the assays disclosed in the 
specification. This is a far cry from, for example, demonstrating a proof of concept of 
just-discovered antisense technology in E. coli, as in Enzo, and then claiming 
antisense DNA for every living organism under the sun.182 Instead, the facts of 
Wyeth are much closer to those of Angstadt, in which the CCPA allowed the broad 
genus claims after concluding that a follow-on inventor could ascertain if any 
particular compound satisfying the claim’s structural limitations works for the 
                                                          
178 Id. at 1386 (quoting Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013)).      
179   Id. (quoting ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
180 Id. at 1385.      
181 Id. at 1386.      
182 See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text. 
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intended catalytic purpose by testing it out.183 Practicing the claims in Wyeth, as in 
Angstadt, did not seem to require “ingenuity beyond that to be expected of one of 
ordinary skill in the art,” but the patentee lost in Wyeth and won in Angstadt.184 
Key to the different results seems to be a significant, though 
unacknowledged, shift in how the Federal Circuit thinks about enablement of genus 
claims. Angstadt and Atlas Powder are focused on the practical challenge facing a 
PHOSITA—how to make and use a species within the genus. If it’s too hard to find 
one that works, whether because the genus itself isn’t really a genus, as in 
Incandescent Lamp, or because of the related problem that the number of 
inoperative species is too high,185 the PHOSITA would have to engage in undue 
experimentation. 
Wyeth, by contrast, worries that the synthesis of the “tens of thousands of 
candidate[]” sirolimus compounds would require undue experimentation.186  That 
does indeed sound like a lot of work.  But why would a PHOSITA have to synthesize 
tens of thousands of candidates?  Even if half of the species in the genus don’t work 
(and there was no evidence that this was actually the case in Wyeth), on average 
                                                          
183 In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1976). One difference from Wyeth is that the 
compounds that must be synthesized and experimented on to practice the claims in 
Angstadt are inorganic rather than organic. But as two of us can attest (Karshtedt and 
Seymore; Lemley is not a chemist), inorganic synthesis is no easier than organic synthesis, 
and some would say much tougher. 
184 Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 503 (quoting Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1390-91 (C.C.P.A. 
1971).       
185 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
186 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
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(i.e., working at random) a PHOSITA might have to try two before finding one that 
does.  Nevertheless, Wyeth reflects a move away from this kind of thinking.  To 
gauge whether the “full scope” of the genus claim is enabled, the court seems to 
assume that the PHOSITA must test every species within the genus for enablement 
purposes. That’s a significant new requirement, one that will prove impossible to 
meet for any sufficiently large genus. And the implications are problematic: as the 
CCPA observed in a related context, “requiring specific testing of the thousands of 
[chemical] analogs encompassed by the present claim in order to satisfy the how-to-
use requirement of § 112 would delay disclosure and frustrate, rather than further, 
the interests of the public.”187 
As two 2019 Federal Circuit opinions confirm, the Wyeth view has now won 
out. In addition, these latest cases have reinforced a troubling dynamic involving 
therapeutic efficacy limitations in claims that also include a chemical genus. In 
Enzo Life Sciences v. Roche Molecular Systems, the court emphasized that “[a]s in 
Wyeth, the asserted claims here require not just a particular structure, but a 
particular functionality.”188 The court then concluded that the claims were not 
enabled because “the specification fails to teach one of skill in the art whether the 
many embodiments of the broad claims would exhibit that required 
functionality.”189 Therapeutic efficacy is a claim-narrowing limitation, so one would 
                                                          
187   In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1980).  
188   Enzo Life Sci., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
189   Id.  
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think that it is easier to enable a claim so limited as opposed to a broader, purely 
structural claim. But the Federal Circuit seemed to say that such limitations in fact 
made the patentee’s job more difficult. The court explained that “even if we assume 
that the specification teaches one of skill in the art how to create the broad range of 
[structures] covered by the claims, . . . the specification still fails to teach one of skill 
in the art which combinations” will produce a product with the claimed functional 
properties.190   
The Federal Circuit’s analysis of the functionality limitation in Enzo suffers 
from the same problem as the “antirestenotis effective” limitation in Wyeth. Yes, the 
PHOSITA needs to find a species that works. But the PHOSITA doesn’t need to find 
every species that works, but just one or perhaps a few structural analogs within the 
genus that accomplish the claimed or intended purpose.  The Federal Circuit seems 
concerned that we don’t know the exact boundaries of the genus if operability is an 
element of the patent claim. But so what? The concern of enablement law has 
always been with practical workability—does the patent teach others what they 
need to know?191  Wyeth and Enzo represent a categorical shift in thinking away 
                                                          
190   Id.  
191 Cf. Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining 
that full scope enablement does not require enablement of a specific embodiment of the 
claim); see also In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting that “given the 
complexities of zoom lens design, the determination, while routine, could be very time-
consuming” but explaining that this in itself is not enough to find the claims nonenabled). 
In Cook, the CCPA ultimately did strike down the claims because the inventors “never 
produced . . . calculations to substantiate the truthfulness of the teaching in their 
specification which the examiner challenged.” Cook, 439 F.2d at 736. This is a more 
traditional view of the enablement requirement, which demands a showing that the 
inventor demonstrate how a PHOSITA could build an embodiment of the invention.  
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from teaching the PHOSITA and towards a precise delineation of the boundaries of 
the claim—even when, as in those cases, the genus was well defined as a matter of 
structure.192   
That shift was cemented in Idenix Pharmaceuticals v. Gilead Sciences.193  In 
Idenix, a divided panel held that the claims at issue failed both the enablement and 
the written description194 requirements as a matter of law.195 The representative 
claim196 was directed to 
A method for the treatment of a hepatitis C virus infection, comprising 
administering an effective amount of a purine or pyrimidine ß-D-2'-
methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleoside [depicted below] . . .      
 
 
While the claimed invention ultimately recites a method of treating the 
hepatitis C virus (HCV), the structural limitation depicted above follows the 
standard approach to claiming chemical compositions generically. As in Wyeth, the 
chemical backbone (here, a so-called “furanosyl nucleoside”) has an invariant core 
                                                          
192 Cf. supra Part I.B.  
193 Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).       
194 The written description part of Idenix is discussed infra in Part II.B.   
195  Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1153.      
196 Id. at 1155.      
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and some structural wild cards on the periphery. The panel majority had no trouble 
invalidating this patent, and even Judge Pauline Newman in dissent argued only 
that it should have been upheld under the significantly narrower claim construction 
that she favored.197  
     As in Wyeth, the majority began by observing that the genus was large. It 
noted that while the claimed structure is limited to a methyl in the 2'-up (i.e., R6) 
position, “the formula provides more than a dozen options at the R1 position, more 
than a dozen independent options at the 2'-down position [(R7)], more than a dozen 
independent options at the 3'-down position [(R9)], and multiple independent 
options for the base.”198 Estimating the factorial, one finds that the total number of 
possible structures within the scope of the claim reaches into several thousand 
species. 
That sounds like a lot, but such large numbers are typical in chemical genus 
claiming—and having a massive genus of compounds to be tested for catalytic 
activity did not ultimately result in an enablement problem in Angstadt or Atlas 
Powder, which were not cited. Moreover, as the district court in Idenix recognized, 
the knowledge of the PHOSITA could help reduce the number of potentially 
working species somewhat based on the judgment that certain substitution patterns 
would prevent a species from functioning as efficacious therapy against HCV 
                                                          
197 Claim construction is an exercise of determining claim scope that must often be 
performed before patent validity is determined. Often, claims fail on § 112(a) grounds in 
cases in which the patentee seeks a broad claim construction. See, e.g. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. 
v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
198   Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1158. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668014




infections.199 With the genus thus limited, Idenix further explained that some 
candidate species could be bought off the shelf as part of a compound library, while 
others could be synthesized using routine methodologies.200 Finally, the 
specification provided several working embodiments, and the Federal Circuit agreed 
that the record supported all these findings.201 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the patent leaves one “searching for a 
needle in a haystack to determine which of the ‘large number’ of 2'-methyl-up 
nucleosides falls into the ‘small’ group of candidates that effectively treats HCV.”202 
Applying Wyeth, it held that the PHOSITA would just have too many compounds to 
obtain and screen because it was not possible to tell in advance for many candidates 
whether their structures would have the desired HCV-treating property.203 As the 
Federal Circuit framed it, “[t]he key enablement question is whether a [PHOSITA] 
would know, without undue experimentation, which 2'-methyl-up nucleosides would 
be effective for treating HCV,”204 and the answer was “no.” Even accepting that the 
disclosed screening process allowed for straightforward identification of working 
embodiments, the court determined the work involved to be excessive for 
enablement purposes. While any particular molecule that falls within the scope of 
                                                          
199 Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., No., 14-846-LPS, 2018 WL 922125, at *14 (D. Del. 
Feb. 16, 2018); see Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1158.      
200   Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1159-60.  
201 Id. at 1161.       
202 Id. at 1162.       
203 Id. at 1162-63 (citing Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384-86 
(Fed. Cir. 2013)).       
204 Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).       
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the genus and is effective against HCV might be readily found, the overall sorting 
process was held to require undue experimentation.205 
This approach is problematic. It focuses on “knowing” instead of “making and 
using,” which is what the text of § 112(a) actually requires, and discounts 
Angstadt’s warning that ex ante “reasonable certainty” that a particular chemical 
structure would work for its intended purpose cannot be required to enable the 
claims.206 As the CCPA astutely noted, if this were so “then all experimentation is 
undue, since the term experimentation implies that the success of the particular 
activity is uncertain.”207 Even though “thousands” of candidates exist and the 
catalysis field as a whole is “an unpredictable art,” the Angstadt genus was enabled 
because “[i]n this art the performance of trial runs using different catalysis is 
‘reasonable,’ even if the end result is uncertain.”208 Such unpredictability was 
characteristic of this mature field—and traversing the claimed genus was a matter 
of “known unknowns.” 
But that is no longer the law. After Wyeth and Idenix, uncertainty with 
respect to whether some subset of species of a chemical genus would achieve the 
                                                          
205 Cf. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 959 F.3d 1091, 1100 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2020) (“In cases involving claims that state certain structural requirements and also 
require performance of some function (e.g., efficacy for a certain purpose), we have 
explained that undue experimentation can include undue experimentation in identifying, 
from among the many concretely identified compounds that meet the structural 
requirements, the compounds that satisfy the functional requirement.” (citing Idenix, 
Roche, Wyeth, and Enzo)). 
206 In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1976).      
207 Id.      
208 Id. at 504.      
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recited therapeutic efficacy—in other words, whether any given species is within 
the boundaries of the claim—can be a fatal flaw for enablement purposes. This is so 
even when the patentee attends to the field’s inevitable unpredictability by 
disclosing a screening mechanism that gives a PHOSITA parameters for “making 
and using” any given embodiment within the structural genus of the claimed 
invention.  
To be sure, even under older Federal Circuit cases like Atlas Powder, a 
defendant could in theory invalidate a claim for lack of enablement if it could 
demonstrate that so many embodiments within the scope of the claim did not 
actually work for the invention’s intended purpose that the PHOSITA, like Edison 
in Incandescent Lamp, would have to try hundreds or thousands to find one that 
worked well.209 But it is crucial to point out that those were not the showings made 
in Wyeth and Idenix. Indeed, in both cases, the respective defendants actually did 
find a species within the genus that ended up working perfectly well210—and did not 
demonstrate that the research that led to this result was difficult to accomplish in 
view of the patent’s disclosure (or that a significant number, or even any, of the 
species within the genus were ineffective). Instead, the respective defendants 
                                                          
209 Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.  Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); see Consol. Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (Incandescent Lamp Patent), 
159 U.S. 465 (1895).      
210 See Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1171-73 (Newman, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 1152 (majority opinion) (noting Food and Drug Administration 
approval for the defendant’s product); Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 
1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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argued that all the operative embodiments would be time-consuming to identify, 
and the court accepted this evidence by itself as decisive of invalidity.  
This is a massive doctrinal shift in the Federal Circuit’s enablement doctrine. 
Indeed, while the court once seemed to suggest that “operability limitations” in 
patent claims can forestall enablement problems altogether,211 we have now 
reached the point that adding such limitations can present nearly insurmountable      
§ 112(a) difficulties for inventors seeking genus claims that also recite a therapeutic 
property of the compounds. 
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s latest enablement case law suggests that the 
process of sorting operative from inoperative embodiments, whether routine or not, 
may be emerging as a critical challenge for patentees defending against claims of 
nonenablement. The enablement inquiry has shifted from the question whether 
making and using the invention requires undue experimentation to whether such 
experimentation is required to figure out which of all the possible species within the 
genus work for the invention’s claimed therapeutic purpose and therefore to define 
the “full scope” of the invention.  Counterintuitively, it may now be better to draft 
broader claims (e.g., pure composition claims) if possible so as to forestall 
arguments about how numerous “variables would or would not impact the 
functionality” of the claimed invention.212  But even that won’t necessarily help if 
                                                          
211 See, e.g., Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 
1186 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
212 Enzo Life Sci., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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the claims don’t make clear exactly what chemicals are or if it takes a long time to 
make every single chemical within the genus. 
Worse yet, the “routine but undue” theory makes it much easier for the 
defendants to argue that genus claims are overbroad on their face. Genus claims 
now fail enablement even when the inventor is not using the scope of the claim to 
effectively lock up a scientific discovery like antisense or technology in a nascent 
field like the use of recombinant DNA for EPO synthesis.213 Any genus claim 
covering a significant number of species in the life sciences and chemical fields, 
which typically come with built-in unpredictability even if the claimed technology is 
mature, is now in question. Accordingly, examples of claims surviving enablement 
challenges on appeal are becoming increasingly rare.     
B. Written Description and the Possession of Genus Claims 
The shift in enablement law we described in the previous section is bad 
enough for chemical patentees. But there’s more. The written description 
requirement, also drawn from § 112(a), has in the last thirty years morphed from a 
fairly limited tool for preventing the inventor from drafting or amending claims 
after the filing date214 to a powerful limit on the scope of patent claims.215 
                                                          
213 Merges & Nelson, supra note _, at 904-08 (discussing problems with allowing broad 
patents on “science-based” inventions); see also Canady, supra note 131.   
214   See supra Part I.B.1. 
215 For early commentary on the shift, see Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: 
Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent 
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62-88 (2000); Janice M. Mueller, The 
Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633-49 (1998); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the 
Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222-26 (1998).  
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The heightened enablement requirement and the new, broader written 
description doctrine have reinforced one another so as to turn § 112(a) into an 
extremely powerful weapon against generic claiming in the life sciences. Although 
the new written description requirement appears to be concerned mainly with 
premature patenting (or “gun jumping”), it has expanded to invalidate originally 
filed generic claims as well as those added or amended during prosecution. Finally, 
as with enablement, therapeutic efficacy limitations can create special written 
description problems for the patentee.216 
        1. Lilly and Written Description as Enablement Plus 
As we noted in Part I, the focus of the original version of the written 
description requirement was on claims introduced after the filing date. To review 
earlier discussion,217 if the patent describes (and even claims) only an individual 
chemical species A and does not include any broadening language, an attempt to 
add a new generic claim X during prosecution will run into a written description 
problem.218 Thus, even if a PHOSITA would have no trouble extrapolating from the 
teachings for making A to synthesize numerous other species (B, C, D) that that fall 
within genus X without undue experimentation, the patent’s failure to indicate that 
the method for making A is generalizable can be fatal to claiming X. A court or the 
PTO would say that a PHOSITA reading the original filing would conclude that the 
                                                          
216  Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Nuvo Pharm. 
(Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Inc., 923 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
217   See supra Part I.C.1. 
218 See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. 
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inventors were not subjectively “in possession” of the genus—they did not 
appreciate that the synthesis of A readily generalized to other species (B, C, D) and 
ultimately to X.219 This example illustrates that a generic claim can be enabled, but 
not described. 
One way an inventor could solve the problem, it would seem, is by including a 
claim to X as part of the original patent filing, because a genus claim should 
indicate to a PHOSITA that the inventors thought they possessed the genus. Before 
the 1990s, patent attorneys were thus probably safe in assuming that any genus 
claimed at the time of filing was also possessed, thus satisfying the written 
description requirement.220 That changed, however, with UC Regents v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., the case that created a significant new route for policing the scope of genus 
claims (among other impacts).221  
In Lilly, the patentee described the structure of a so-called “complementary” 
DNA (cDNA) that encodes insulin in the rat, and attempted to extrapolate from this 
discovery to the cDNAs for insulin in any mammal.222 The practical implications are 
worth appreciating here: no one really cared about rat cDNA for its own sake 
because the commercially valuable use of the invention was to produce insulin in 
                                                          
219 See generally Jules E. Goldberg, Genus, Species, and the Patent Law, 53 J. PAT OFF. 
SOC’Y 73 (1971) (discussing the failures of genus claims that were not supported by enough 
species in the patent’s specification).  
220 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161-63 (2006). 
221   Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
222 Id. at 1563. Another claim covered the genus of vertebrates.       
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other mammals—particularly, humans—so the inventors included a generic 
mammalian claim in their original patent filing.223 
The reader may recall the foregoing discussion of Amgen v. Chugai and 
conclude that this claim at least had an enablement problem—only one species of 
DNA is disclosed, and a large number (the whole mammalian kingdom!) is 
claimed.224 However, as much as we humans might not like it, there is significant 
homology (i.e., similarity) between the DNA of rats and humans – something on the 
order of 97%.225 And if the methodology for isolating rat insulin cDNA readily 
translates from rats to cDNAs coding for insulins in humans and other mammals, 
we have the very scenario discussed in the previous paragraph: the making of A (rat 
insulin cDNA) can be extrapolated to B (human), C (primate), and D (dolphin), and 
the genus X (mammalian insulin cDNA) is enabled.226  
But the Federal Circuit didn’t reach the enablement question at all. Instead, 
it invalidated the mammalian insulin cDNA claim for inadequate written 
description, rejecting the argument that its inclusion in the original filing showed 
the inventors’ appreciation that their rat work generalizes to other mammals like 
humans.  
                                                          
223   Id. at 1564. 
224 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
225   Graeme I. Bell et al., Sequence of the human insulin gene, 284 NATURE 26 (1980); Colin 
W. Hay & Kevin Docherty, Comparative Analysis of Insulin Gene Promoters: Implications 
for Diabetes Research, 55 DIABETES 3201 (2006). 
226 Perhaps, the homology may have been sufficient to save this claim from an enablement 
challenge. See Sampson, supra note _. 
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How could there be a written description problem when the originally filed 
claim itself contained the genus claim? Proceeding from the starting point that a 
DNA is at bottom a chemical compound, the court explained that there can be no 
possession of the DNA without knowledge of its “sequence,” or chemical structure. 
The court noted that “a generic statement such as . . . ‘mammalian insulin cDNA,’ 
without more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does 
not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function,” or “define any 
structural features commonly possessed by members of the genus that distinguish 
them from others.”227 In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected the view that the 
written description requirement is used to police only priority (e.g., introduction of 
claims after filing, narrow or broad, that are not supported by the specification),228 
as opposed to early patenting or claim scope.229  
The University of California inventors were thus left with an essentially 
worthless exclusive right to the rat insulin cDNA.230  And inventors more generally 
were left with a problem: they had to provide “a precise definition, such as by 
structure, formula, [or] chemical name, of the claimed subject matter sufficient to 
distinguish it from other materials”231 in order to describe a genus claim, even if the 
                                                          
227    Lilly, 113 F.3d at 1568.           
228 See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991).      
229 See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology at the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 441 (2004). 
230 Karen G. Potter, Getting Written Description Right in the Biotechnology Arts: A Realist 
Approach to Patent Scope, 28 BIOTECH. L. REP. 1 (2009). 
231  Lilly, 113 F.3d. at 1568. 
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PHOSITA could figure out what was in the genus and how to use it without undue 
experimentation. 
Lilly quite clearly rested on the Federal Circuit’s policy judgment that the 
inventors filed their patent application too soon in the research process by trying to 
lay claim to human insulin cDNA before figuring out its structure. The court said as 
much when it noted that the specification and claims were directed only to “a mere 
wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.”232 Indeed, Lilly was 
arguably more about timing than overbreadth, as the narrow claim to human 
insulin DNA was also invalidated for lack of written description.233 For both the 
human species and the mammalian genus claims, the Federal Circuit’s problem was 
the lack of information about the structure of insulin cDNAs other than for those of 
the rat. As a result, the applicants effectively used “cDNA” as a functional term—
equivalent to “any sequence that codes for insulin”—in the human and mammalian 
claims. Nonetheless, as we will soon see, Lilly has had a lasting impact on more 
traditional (i.e., non-functional) genus claims too. 
The Lilly court’s efforts to square its policy focus on early patenting with the 
distinct problem of generic claiming, as well as its struggle to distinguish how genus 
claims are analyzed under the enablement and written description different prongs 
of § 112(a), presage the doctrinal drift that is now making genus claims practically 
impossible to defend in court. Lilly has created a second way of challenging genus 
                                                          
232   Id. at 1566. 
233 Id. at 1567. 
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claims that is similar to enablement,234 but without explaining precisely how the 
process of proper extrapolation from species to genus differs for written 
description.235 We do know, however, that post-Lilly written description does not 
require addressing undue experimentation or priority issues. A generic claim may 
well be enabled based on a PHOSITA’s ability to readily make multiple species, but 
not described—even if the inventor attempts to show the genus’s possession by 
claiming it in the original filing or using broadening language.   
The Lilly opinion also reveals an important dynamic in the Federal Circuit’s 
use of § 112(a) as a policy tool. Indeed, some commentators have explicitly called 
Lilly written description “super-enablement” or “enablement plus,” suggesting that 
it creates an extra hurdle for biotech inventions.236  That extra hurdle can’t be 
satisfied by showing that the PHOSITA can make and use human insulin cDNA 
without undue experimentation.  
The Federal Circuit’s overarching desire to prevent patentees from jumping 
the gun and locking up nascent technology may explain its willingness to dispense 
with considering certain Wands factors (as in some enablement cases, like 
                                                          
234 Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 1, 4, 17, 78-80 (2007); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1653-54 (2003).  
235 See Guang Ming Whitley, Note, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The “Extended” 
Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 624 (2004). 
236   Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 230; Holman, supra note 230. 
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Amgen)237 or even all of them (as in written description decisions, particularly those 
involving functional claims). One way or another, the court concluded, the claims in 
Amgen and Lilly had to be invalid, and the new tests ensured the court’s ability to 
reach the results it believed to be correct on policy grounds. But the court never 
explicitly tied these opinions to concerns with early patenting, which meant that 
Amgen and Lilly could henceforth be used against genus claims directed to 
relatively mature generically claimed inventions, not just nascent ones. Thus, the 
Federal Circuit’s approach has come with the costs of eroding doctrinal stability: the 
focus of enablement shifted from targeting “unknown unknowns” to “known 
unknowns,”238 and written description drifted to endanger genus claims that have 
not presented significant gun jumping or late claiming concerns. 
These doctrinal shortcuts are worth lingering on because their effects on the 
§ 112(a)’s many functions are crucial to understanding the origins of the Federal 
Circuit’s current attitude toward—really, against—genus claiming. To be clear, the 
written description requirement continues to play multiple discrete, and rather 
different, roles. It polices priority, and after Lilly, it also prevents gun jumping and 
functional claiming.  But today it also significantly limits claim scope.  
2. Entrenchment and growth as a weapon against genus claims 
 a. The Ariad case 
                                                          
237 See Kellam, supra note 164; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 
1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (failing to credit the level of skill in the art in the Wands 
analysis).  
238 See supra note 154. 
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     Written description is not going away. Controversy over this 
requirement239 prompted the Federal Circuit to convene en banc in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co.240 In Ariad, the court reaffirmed both that the 
written description requirement was separate from enablement and that it could 
apply to originally filed claims.241 But while the court reached a result that we 
believe to be correct given the facts of the case, it further contributed to the 
undeserved demise of biotech and chemical genus claims. 
Similar to UC Regents v. Lilly, the claim at issue in Ariad was drafted in 
functional terms. But the Federal Circuit’s analysis of Ariad’s patents reveals a 
subtle interplay of distinct policy concerns with overbreadth, functional language, 
and timing. The court observed that the claim at issue was broad and reaffirmed 
Lilly when it stated the patent as a whole must “demonstrate[ ] that the applicant 
has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus.”242 Expanding on this 
point, it then noted that “[t]he problem is especially acute with genus claims that 
use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus.”243 This 
language is something of a hedge, suggesting that functional claiming may signal a 
                                                          
239 Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Rader, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., dissenting from the order 
denying rehearing en banc); Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1315-21 (Rader, J., dissenting from the 
order denying rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 
981–83 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc). 
240   See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 1349.      
243 Id.      
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written description problem,244 but is not required to invalidate claims on this 
ground. But this was not all, as the court also described the claim as directed to a 
“research hypothes[i]s” and “an unfinished invention.” This language conveys yet 
another problem—with early patenting—which may yet be still further reason that 
the claims should be invalid.  
As a factual matter, there were plenty of reasons to reject Ariad’s claim, and 
we believe that the functional nature of it was the strongest one—because of 
potentially infinite scope of functional claims. The overarching issue was that the 
inventors did not sufficiently disclose any chemicals that could accomplish the 
claimed function, for the simple reason that they hadn’t actually discovered or 
tested any such chemicals. And ultimately, in invalidating the claims, the Federal 
Circuit reiterated that the claims and their description had problems with breadth, 
functionality, and timing. But it was not apparent whether all the reasons for 
holding the claims invalid meant that the result in Ariad was overdetermined,245 
and the opinion never made it clear which rationale was particularly critical to its 
decision.246 
                                                          
244 For straightforward examples of purely functional claims invalidated for lack of 
adequate written description, see AbbVie Deutschland GMBH v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 
F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
245 Cf. Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119. YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 127, 139-42 (2010) (arguing that the written description requirement doesn’t 
necessarily prohibit broad claims).  
246   Id. at 1354-58. 
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Some parsing may have been useful, however. Claims can be broad, but 
neither early nor functional (many chemical genus claims); narrow, early, and 
functional (the human insulin cDNA claim in Lilly); broad, functional, but not early 
(as when, even when the invention is “finished,” the patent attorney still chooses to 
claim it by function), and so on. Consistent with the history of the written 
description requirement, the thrust of the policy behind the opinion appeared to be 
timing—in that a purely functional claim suggests that the inventor has jumped the 
gun and filed the application to soon. The Ariad court forcefully stated near the 
conclusion of its exposition of the law that “requiring a written description of the 
invention limits patent protection to those who actually perform the difficult work 
of ‘invention.’”247 Nevertheless, the doctrinal analysis was not explicitly so cabined. 
It may be that any one of the three potential problems would have doomed the 
claims, only some, or perhaps it was their combination or cumulation that was the 
real issue. As a doctrinal matter, the court’s lack of clarity on this score was 
significant: it created openings for multiple distinct lines of written description 
attacks, which have been pursued with great success against genus claims in 
subsequent cases. 
 b. Further impact on genus claims  
Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson illustrates the dynamics of 
written description as a weapon against genus claims.248 The technology will be 
                                                          
247 Id. at 1353.      
248   Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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familiar from the Wyeth decision discussed above in the enablement section: it 
involved the clearing of arterial plaque with stents while mitigating the dangerous 
hardening of the arteries, or restenosis.249 Instead of method claims as in Wyeth, the 
patents at issue in Boston Scientific were directed to stent devices covered with 
therapeutic agents.250 Similar to Wyeth, however, the patent specifications in Boston 
Scientific were focused on one therapeutic species, sirolimus, but broadly claimed 
various macrocyclic analogs of the rapamycin genus.251 Instead of invalidating the 
claims for lack of enablement as in Wyeth, however, the court relied on written 
description. 
But the Federal Circuit’s problem with the claims in Boston Scientific was 
very different from that in the key written description precedents that we just 
discussed. Unlike Lilly or Ariad, the inventors in Boston Scientific hardly jumped 
the gun to patent a mere research hypothesis. In contrast to the dearth of chemical 
information for human insulin DNA in Lilly, a PHOSITA could readily “visualize or 
recognize” the structures of the various rapamycin macrocycles. In addition, while 
the Ariad inventors claimed every chemical under the sun that could accomplish a 
particular biological function—without providing any examples of such chemicals, 
or really any structural information at all,the inventors in Boston Scientific actually 
reduced the invention to practice with the sirolimus species, getting antirestenosis 
                                                          
249 The two cases, however, dealt with patents of somewhat different scope and the court 
used slightly different terminology in naming the genus. 
250 Id. at 1357-58.      
251 Id. at 1358-59.      
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668014




to work on a stent with this molecule. Nevertheless, as the Federal Circuit saw it, 
the claims still had an overbreadth problem.252 Even though the claims were 
drafted in structural rather than functional terms, they still failed for lack of 
adequate written description. 
The Boston Scientific court did discuss function, but in a very different sense 
from Lilly and Ariad—in which the claims were wholly devoid of chemical structure. 
Instead, it explained that “there is insufficient correlation between the function and 
structure of [sirolimus] and its analogs to provide adequate written description 
support for the entire genus of macrocyclic lactone analogs of rapamycin.”253 As in 
Wyeth, an enablement case, the Federal Circuit in Boston Scientific thus found it 
significant that the inventors lacked the knowledge of how structural modifications 
of the rapamycins would affect their antirestenotic properties. 
But the effect of structural changes in chemical compounds on therapeutic 
efficacy can rarely be predicted ex ante, so it is really not clear how much more the 
patentee could have done if it wanted to claim its antirestenosis invention as a 
chemical genus. Indeed, as Jake Sherkow observed, “drug composition claims may 
allow so much variability . . . as to make the written-description requirement 
virtually impossible.”254 In Wyeth, the court at least relied on an undisputed factual 
                                                          
252  Thus, invalidating one group of claims under review, the court explained that “[w]hile a 
small number of [sirolimus] analogs were known in the prior art, the claims cover tens of 
thousands of possible macrocyclic lactone analogs.” Id. at 1365. 
253 Id. at 1366.      
254   Jacob S. Sherkow, Describing Drugs: A Response to Allison and Ouellette, 65 DUKE L.J. 
ONLINE 127, 131 (2016).  
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assertion that synthesizing and testing the members of the structural genus for 
antirestenotic activity would take a long time as it concluded that the claims were 
not enabled. But in Boston Scientific, the court did not even do that.  It invalidated 
the claims for lack of “possession” of the genus because a link between structure and 
properties was missing.255  The patentee knew what the genus was and how some 
embodiments worked. But even if the genus were enabled, which is an issue the 
Federal Circuit did not reach, the patentee still failed under written description 
because it didn’t give us a complete map of which structures performed the desired 
function. The genus claim simply had no chance. 
Idenix Pharmaceuticals v. Gilead Sciences, first discussed above in the 
enablement section, also relied on written description as an alternative ground to 
invalidate the claims directed to a method of treating the hepatitis C virus with a 
class of compounds having a furanosyl nucleoside core.256 In this part of the opinion, 
the court focused on the defendant’s infringing product, which had a fluorine 
substituent on the core nucleoside ring in the so-called 2'-down position.257 Indeed, 
the 2'-fluoro-down material played a critical role in the Federal Circuit’s decision 
that the genus was not adequately described because the court framed the validity 
inquiry in terms of “whether the specification demonstrates possession of the 
[fluorine-substituted] nucleosides that are the basis for [defendant’s] accused 
                                                          
255 Bos. Sci., 647 F.3d at 1364.      
256 Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
257 Id. at 1155.      
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668014




product.”258 The Federal Circuit, in sum, invalidated the claims under written 
description because a particular set of working species was not specifically called 
out in the patent, even though the specification taught PHOSITAs how to make 
structurally analogous molecules and even to test whether varying the structures 
produced molecules that worked. 
The court’s methodology is notable. The patent listed numerous examples of 
compounds falling within the scope of the generic structure and having the claimed 
therapeutic property of treating HCV,259 but the accused fluorine-substituted 
product was not mentioned. Seizing on this point, the court noted several times that 
the specification’s failure to recite this material or other fluorine-based derivatives 
at the 2'-down position was “conspicuous,”260 even though fluorine may not warrant 
explicit mention because it is a common substituent that can be readily visualized 
by a PHOSITA. In doing so, the court came close to punishing the patentee for 
providing too many representative examples, noting that the various formulas listed 
in specification included numerous substitution patterns except for the 2'-fluoro-
down.261  
The absence of this set of species doomed the entire genus under the written 
description ground both for reasons of structure and function. The Federal Circuit 
concluded that the patent “fails to provide sufficient blaze marks to direct a 
                                                          
258 Id. at 1163-64. 
259 Id. at 1161.      
260 Id. at 1165.      
261 Id.      
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[PHOSITA] to the specific subset of 2'-methyl-up nucleosides that are effective in 
treating HCV.”262 It further explained that, in spite of the disclosed working 
examples, “[t]he specification . . . provides no method of distinguishing effective 
from ineffective compounds for the compounds reaching beyond the formulas 
disclosed in the ’597 patent.”263 But in unpredictable life sciences arts there often is 
no “method” other than trial and error. As suggested above, a tiny structural change 
can lead to massive therapeutic differences, so the patentee can often provide no 
“blaze marks”264 other than by conducting experiments on as many species as 
possible. Here, the patentee did just that.  But because it didn’t specifically list the 
2'-fluro-down subgenus, the claim was invalidated for lack of written description.265 
Idenix is particularly notable because it doesn’t map to any of the 
justifications for the written description doctrine.  The claim was not drafted in 
purely functional terms; the patentees did not jump the gun because the invention 
was reduced to practice and numerous working examples were provided; and the 
genus, though broad, was supported by several species—not just one, as in Boston 
Scientific. But the claim failed written description because the defendant’s 
compound was not specifically listed among the identified working examples. As a 
result, even if a PHOSITA could synthesize and test the claim’s various species so 
                                                          
262 Id. at 1164.      
263 Id.      
264 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995 (C.C.P.A. 1967).           
265  Cf. Pitlick, supra note _, at 221 (predicting this problem in his analysis of UC Regents v. 
Lilly).      
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rapidly that experimentation to select the operative embodiments was facile enough 
to pass enablement, the claim would have still been invalid. The inventors’ only 
option for keeping the broad claim, it seems, was to make and test nearly every 
possible species.  Even then, their claim would seemingly be invalid under Idenix as 
long as the defendant came up with an unlisted species that worked.  That turns 
the law of genus claims on its head.266  
* * * 
The combination of enablement and written description has proven 
particularly difficult for patentees to overcome.  It is, of course, not unusual for a 
judgment to be reachable on two or more alternative grounds. But the now close 
similarity between written description and enablement as tools for challenging 
genus claims essentially allows defendants to characterize various pieces of 
evidence (disclosures in the specification, the state of the art, expert testimony) in 
such a way as to take two shots at the claims in the hope that one of them sticks. 
Often, they do: for example, even if the plaintiff introduces enough testimony on the 
Wands factors to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding undue 
experimentation, the court can sidestep that testimony, look on the face of the 
patent, and hold that there is no “possession” and thus a written description 
                                                          
266   Of course, another approach was to claim only a narrow subgenus of the species that 
worked and avoid generalizing altogether. But that defeats the whole purpose of genus 
claiming as a way of creating meaningful patent protection beyond the working 
embodiments. 
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failure.267 We have seen the converse as well: a claim that survived a written 
description challenge on remand, in spite of the Federal Circuit’s strong suggestion 
that it was invalid under this requirement, still failed enablement.268 As weapons 
against genus claims, enablement and written description make for a powerful 
combination both procedurally and substantively. 
C. Claims Surviving § 112(a) Challenges 
The cases we have highlighted so far in this Part are just a sampling of the 
Federal Circuit’s rejection of genus claims. There are many more appellate decisions 
striking down genus claims for lack of enablement, written description, or both 
during the post-1990 era, often overturning the district court or a jury verdict in the 
process.269  These cases illustrate a consistent pattern of genus claim failure. There 
are only a few post-1990 exceptions, and we think they actually prove the rule that 
                                                          
267   See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Amgen Inc. v. 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claim can satisfy enablement 
but still fail written description); compare Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011), with Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384-86 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (using written description and enablement, respectively, to invalidate 
similar patents). 
268   Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, No. 14-1317-RGA, 2019 WL 4058927, at *3-13 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 
2019), on remand from Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017), appeal after 
remand docketed, No. 20-1074 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2019).  
269   See, e.g., Nuvo Pharm. (Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Inc., 923 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AbbVie 
Deutschland GMBH v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Novozymes A/S v. Dupont Nutrition Bioscis., APS, 723 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Centocor 
Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re ’318 Patent 
Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 541 F.3d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk 
A/S, 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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such claims usually have no chance at the Federal Circuit. Each comes with a 
special (and limited) circumstance.270 
One notable category of appeals in which genus claims were sometimes 
upheld against § 112(a) challenges involved so-called interferences, which are now-
obsolete adversarial PTO proceedings for resolving who among two or more 
competing inventors, or groups of inventors, came up with the claimed subject 
matter first.271 Interferences are a special case, and the Federal Circuit’s 
interference decisions have had a limited impact on the court’s § 112(a) 
jurisprudence more generally. The remaining few cases we identified in which 
generic claims survived enablement or written description attacks on appeal can be 
classified into claims directed to a relatively small genus; challenges to the breadth 
of limitations directed to claim features that are well-known already and are not the 
invention’s focus; and other outlier examples, which feature unusual genus claims, 
failures of proof, as well as combinations of some of these characteristics. We believe 
that these cases, which we consider below in turn, are also of limited practical 
significance for the validity of traditional genus claims. 
1. Interferences 
An interference proceeding is a so-called “priority contest” between two or 
more parties.272 Although the standards for enablement and written description in 
                                                          
270   There are also cases in which genus claims prevailed in a patent case where the defendant 
didn’t raise full-scope enablement or written description arguments.  We don’t include them 
in our analysis here, though we discuss their significance infra Part III. 
271 See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).  
272 Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).      
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interferences are congruent with those in appeals from PTO rejections or district 
court judgments, the ultimate question is which of the parties in a race to be the 
first to patent the invention is entitled to priority. As a result, an interference 
proceeding typically ends with someone’s claims getting upheld as the earlier of the 
two inventors.  Neither party to an interference has an incentive to argue that no 
one can have a claim that broad.  Instead, their arguments tend to focus on more 
traditional timing issues around written description—did the alleged first inventor 
jump the gun by filing too early?  
Perhaps because an interference must usually result in a winner, § 112(a)’s 
requirements may be applied in a manner more friendly to genus claims than in 
other types of appeals. One example is Singh v. Brake, in which the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the PTO’s grant of priority to an inventor of a so-called “DNA construct” 
claim, deferring to the agency’s conclusion that it was adequately described and 
enabled.273 The § 112(a) discussion in Singh has only been cited in one other 
precedential Federal Circuit opinion, and only for the basic proposition that “the 
written description requirement . . . is a question of fact, reviewed for substantial 
evidence.”274 
Another pro-patentee result in an interference appeal—which, however, does 
not follow the usual pattern of someone being declared a winner—is Capon v. 
                                                          
273   317 F.3d 1334, 1343-46 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
274 Bilstad v. Wakapoulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In contrast, some of the 
cases striking down genus claims (e.g., Enzo v. Calgene and Ariad v. Lilly) have been cited 
numerous times for substantive propositions in subsequent Federal Circuit opinions. 
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Esshar.275 This case, similar to UC Regents v. Eli Lilly & Co.,276 involved claims 
directed to DNAs for which structural information was lacking. Oddly enough, the 
parties ended up on the same side of the appeal after the PTO concluded sua sponte 
that neither set of claims was adequately described.277 The Federal Circuit vacated 
and remanded, holding that the PTO “erred that § 112 requires a per se rule 
requiring recitation in the specification of the nucleotide sequence of the claimed 
DNA, when that sequence is already known in the field.”278 At the Federal Circuit, 
Capon was followed in another interference appeal279 and cited for basic 
propositions in other cases.280  Capon, however, has been consistently distinguished 
in non-interference written description cases involving the validity of genus claims, 
including Ariad and Boston Scientific.281 More telling, the Federal Circuit even 
distinguished Capon in another written description case involving DNA, Carnegie 
Mellon University v. Hoffman-La Roche,282 in which the court followed UC Regents 
                                                          
275  418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).      
276   Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
277 Capon, 418 F.3d at 1350.      
278  Id. at 1360-61; cf. Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (arguably creating just such a per se rule outside 
the interference context).      
279 Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
280 In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Goeddel v. Sugano, 617 
F.3d 1350, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010).       
281 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Bos. 
Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
282   541 F.3d 1115, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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v. Eli Lilly & Co. instead and invalidated the claims at issue.283 In sum, Capon has 
not had a lasting influence at the Federal Circuit.  
2. Small Genuses and Genuses Known Prior to the 
Invention 
       Another example of a patent surviving § 112(a) challenges at the Federal 
Circuit, from the case of Martek Biosciences v. Nutrinova, Inc.,284 involves a 
relatively narrow genus claim, as well as an apparent failure to offer proof of 
nonenablement. The claims at issue in Martek were directed to a process of 
extracting fatty acids from certain kinds of fish.285 The defendants introduced 
evidence of nonenablement of the broad independent claim in the patent in suit, but 
“failed to present any evidence . . . that one of ordinary skill in the art must perform 
undue experimentation”286 to practice the narrower dependent claims. Moreover, at 
trial, an expert opined that these claims encompass 22 biological species, a 
statement that the Federal Circuit determined to “support an inference that there 
are a relatively few potential species that may meet the limitations of” these 
                                                          
283 Id. at 1124-27.      
284 Martek Biocis. Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
285 Id. at 1367.      
286 Id. at 1379.      
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claims.287 The court thus upheld the claims, but as with Singh, future Federal 
Circuit panels relied on Martek only for neutral propositions.288 
The written description challenge addressed in the recent Ajinomoto Co. v. 
International Trade Commission decision failed for a different reason—it was 
lodged at a genus that was well-known prior to the invention at issue.289 The 
asserted claims were directed to cultivating E. coli bacteria to produce an essential 
amino acid “by replacing the native promoter which precedes the DNA on the 
chromosome of the bacterium with a more potent promoter,”290 and the invalidity 
arguments were focused on the “more potent promoter” limitation.291 The focus of 
the invention was not the promoters at all, but the discovery of the gene whose 
modification with a promoter boosted the amino acid production. As for the 
promoters themselves, “the genus of more potent promoters was already well 
                                                          
287 Id. To similar effect is Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 745 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 
2014).  In Alcon, the Federal Circuit overturned invalidations on both enablement and 
written description grounds.  While the case was presented as a full scope enablement case, 
the court concluded that while there were many different possible variants of the claim, the 
PHOSITA would understand that they all worked as intended and claimed, and varied only 
in efficacy. Id. at 1189. It found the claims valid “because Barr did not show that any 
claimed embodiments would be inoperable and that a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would have been unable to practice the asserted claims without resorting to any 
experimentation, let alone undue experimentation.”  Id. at 1190. The claims likewise 
survived a written description attack. Id. at 1191-92.      
288  See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 
699 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Martek for the proposition that enablement is a 
question of law based on underlying facts, resulting in plenary review of the former and 
substantial evidence of the latter). 
289 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Monsanto Corp. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (holding that use of well-known promoters was enabled).      
290 Id. at 1347.      
291 Id. at 1358-59.      
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explored in the relevant art”292 and the specification mentioned several of them. The 
Federal Circuit determined that the patentee sufficiently supported the genus by 
including in the “specification, read in light of the background knowledge in the art, 
a representative number of species for the genus of more potent promoters.”293 The 
court also distinguished Lilly and Boston Scientific and concluded that the art’s 
familiarity with more potent promoters meant that the common structural features 
of the genus were also adequately described.294 As a result, “a skilled artisan could 
make relatively predictable changes to the native promoter to arrive at a more 
potent promoter”295 and the claims survived § 112(a).   
3. Other Cases 
We have found only two more Federal Circuit opinions upholding genus 
claims in the past thirty years.  Both decisions were made for reasons that are not 
easy to classify precisely, but that we believe are unusual. In Invitrogen Corp. v. 
Clontech Laboratories, the claims in suit were directed to a so-called “reverse 
transciptase” (RT), which is an enzyme involved in DNA replication.296  In its 
enablement challenge, the defendant complained that the specification failed to 
describe all the possible methods of making the enzyme.297 This argument was 
                                                          
292 Id. at 1359.      
293 Id.      
294 Id. at 1360-61.      
295 Id. at 1361.      
296   Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
297 Id. at 1070.      
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unsuccessful: while the universe of methods for making a particular composition 
might be described as a kind of a genus,298 in practice the Federal Circuit has 
consistently treated claims characterized as directed to “a genus of methods” 
differently (and apparently much more leniently) than claims to a traditional 
structural genus.299 In this context, “the enablement requirement is met if the 
description enables any mode of making and using the invention” and the one 
method for making the enzyme disclosed in the specification was sufficient under 
this rule.300 
The written description challenge to a specific group of RT claims, which 
were drafted in functional terms to recite “[a]n isolated polypeptide . . . having 
substantially reduced RNase H activity,”301 also failed. The defendant argued that 
the “DNA or protein sequences” of the enzyme were not recited, but the Federal 
Circuit retorted that this argument “proceeds from a factual premise contrary to the 
record.”302 Instead, as the court noted, the specification “recite[d] both the DNA and 
amino acid sequences of a representative embodiment of the claimed RT enzyme” 
                                                          
298 Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions, supra note _, at 130-33. 
299 Cf. Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New 
Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3; Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in 
Patent Law, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1097 (2011); Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising 
Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009); Timothy Chen Saulsbury, Pioneers Versus 
Improvers: Enabling Optimal Claim Scope, Note, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439 
443, 463 (2010).  
300   Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added) (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. 
CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Jason Rantanen, The Doctrinal 
Structure of Patent Law’s Enablement Requirement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1681-83 (2016). 
301 Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis in original). 
302 Id. at 1073.      
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and “disclose[d] test data that the enzyme produced by the listed sequence has the 
claimed features—DNA polymerase activity without RNase H activity.”303  While it 
is not entirely clear what the genus size was, the defendant never made an 
overbreadth argument,304 which rendered this question irrelevant. In any event, 
Invitrogen—like the other cases discussed in this section—has had limited impact 
on the development of the Federal Circuit’s law of enablement.305 
We finally come to the complex opinion in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel,306 in which a split Federal Court panel affirmed the judgment after a bench 
trial that the claims at issue were adequately described and enabled. A 
representative claim recited “[a] pharmaceutical composition comprising a 
therapeutically effective amount of human erythropoietin . . . , wherein said 
erythropoietin is purified from mammalian cells grown in culture.”307 After 
“commend[ing] the district court for its thorough, careful, and precise work on what 
is indubitably a legally difficult and technologically complex case,”308 the majority 
deferred heavily to the lower court’s fact findings. The court also noted that the trial 
judge had in turn relied to a significant extent on the clear and convincing standard 
                                                          
303 Id.      
304 The defendant’s failure to make an overbreadth argument made possible by Federal 
Circuit opinions like Idenix might explain some examples of cases in which genus claims 
have survived district court proceedings. See infra Part III.   
305  See, e.g., In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citing Invitrogen for a generic proposition). 
306 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
307 Id. at 1323.      
308 Id. at 1320.      
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required to prove invalidity and had concluded that the defendant did not meet this 
burden.309 
One of the issues in Hoechst was whether the “mammalian” limitation made 
the claim overbroad. Emphasizing that compliance with the written description 
requirement is a question of fact reviewed for clear error after a bench trial, the 
Federal Circuit noted that “the district court carefully examined whether . . . the 
specification adequately described the full breadth of the claims”310 and concluded 
that the defendant failed to overcome the presumption of validity. Indeed, the lower 
“court weighed the testimony and found that the evidence showed that the 
descriptions adequately described to those of ordinary skill in the art [at the time of 
filing] the use of the broad class of available mammalian and vertebrate cells to 
produce the claimed high levels of human EPO in culture.”311 The Federal Circuit 
found no error, explaining that cases like UC Regents v. Lilly were distinguishable 
because the claim was not directed to DNA but rather to the mammalian genus 
itself as the source of EPO, and there was no doubt what animals fit in the genus 
“mammal.”312 The word “mammalian,” the court noted, readily “‘convey[ed] 
distinguishing information concerning [the genus’s] identity’ such that ‘one of 
                                                          
309 Id. at 1331, 1339. 
310 Id. at 1330-31. 
311 Id. at 1331. 
312 Id. at 1332. 
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ordinary skill in the art could ‘visualize or recognize the identity of the members of 
the genus.’”313 
The defendant fared no better on enablement, with the Federal Circuit noting 
that “the district court made thorough and complete factual findings supporting its 
holding that the claims were not proven not enabled, expressly incorporating many 
of its factual determinations made with respect to written description.”314 One of the 
findings was that the method of production of EPO generalizes readily from two 
mammals for which it was actually done to others: “the [trial] court accepted 
testimony indicating that [a PHOSITA] would infer from the [representative] cell 
examples that similar outcomes could be expected from other mammalian cells 
since all mammalian cells produce and secrete hormones like EPO by means of the 
same fundamental processes.”315 After noting that “[t]hese are all findings of fact 
and they have not shown to be clearly erroneous,” the majority upheld the claims.316 
In dissent, Judge Raymond Clevenger wryly noted that “[w]hile I share my 
colleagues’ admiration for the considerable efforts of the district court in this 
complicated case, I cannot share their faith that the district court properly and 
conscientiously applied” Federal Circuit precedent.317 The dissent’s main concern 
was that the panel majority misapplied § 112(a) law to “source and process” 
                                                          
313 Id. (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567). 
314 Id. at 1334-35. 
315 Id. at 1335. 
316 Id.      
317 Id. at 1361 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
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limitations of the claims, such as “mammalian,” a framing suggesting a limit to the 
scope of the holding because such limitations do not often come up in genus 
claiming.318 As such, this case, too, had limited impact.319 
Amgen v. Hoechst is the case that looks most like the § 112(a) jurisprudence 
of old.  But it is more than 17 years old, drew a dissent, and has not been used to 
justify broad claims in the decades since its decision. 
* * * 
  The path of the law is messy. That is even more so when courts are moving 
the law in new directions, as they are with enablement and written description.  
But while the cases aren’t unanimous, the opinions discussed in this section do not 
detract from the conclusion that the Federal Circuit’s approach to traditional genus 
claims in chemical and biological sciences has been hostile. All these cases present 
an unusual procedural posture (indeed, for interference appeals, one that no longer 
exists), a challenge against a genus that was small or well-known, or another 
claiming or procedural feature, such as process limitations and exhaustive fact 
findings in the Hoechst bench trial, that made the genus unusually susceptible to 
being upheld.  
                                                          
318 Id. at 1359. For discussion of such claims, see Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce 
Inventions, supra note _. 
319 The most significant Federal Circuit opinion relying on Hoechst to uphold claims against 
a written description challenge is Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), discussed above. In other cases, such as In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), Hoechst was distinguished. 
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Notwithstanding these exceptions, we conclude that chemical genus claims 
do not do well against § 112(a) challenges at the Federal Circuit, and haven’t for 
almost thirty years.  That is a fundamental reversal of the way the law used to be—
and the way many lawyers, companies, and scholars may assume it still is. 
III. Should We Save Genus Claims? 
A. A Troubling Shift in Precedent 
The move to invalidate large genus claims on enablement and written 
description grounds reflects a puzzling and troubling doctrinal shift. In this section, 
we argue that the Federal Circuit has significantly (and likely unintentionally) 
shifted what it means to “enable (or describe) the full scope of the claim” in ways 
that make many genus claims unsustainable.  In doing so, it has conflated different 
legal theories and justifications for restricting the scope of genus claims. And it has 
broken the symmetry that has traditionally existed between obviousness analysis 
under § 103 and the disclosure rules of § 112. 
1. What Does the PHOSITA Know?  
Both sections 103 and 112 set standards based on the knowledge and 
experience of the person having skill in the art, or PHOSITA.  The PHOSITA is 
rather like the “reasonable expert” in patent law.  When we test whether a patent 
has done something nonobvious under § 103, we ask whether the PHOSITA would 
have been motivated to make the new invention and had a reasonable expectation 
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of success.320  And when we decide how much information the patentee must 
disclose, we turn again to the PHOSITA, making sure the patent discloses enough 
that the PHOSITA can make and use the invention.  The PHOSITAs aren’t always 
exactly the same; they are working as of different times, and they are doing 
somewhat different things (inventing versus making and using),321 but in general 
there is symmetry between obviousness and disclosure that turns on the level of 
skill in the art.  If the PHOSITA in a field knows a lot, an invention is more likely to 
be obvious but also doesn’t need as much detail to educate her. If she knows very 
little, by contrast, it’s easier to show nonobviousness (because she was less likely to 
figure it out) but you must teach more to make sure she understands it. 
That symmetry held for decades in the chemical arts.  Courts regularly tell us 
that chemistry is an unpredictable art, so PHOSITAs can’t know what effects 
modifications would have.322  But chemical compounds have a regular and well-
understood structure, so courts confronting obviousness challenges have long held, 
and the Federal Circuit confirmed in the seminal case of In re Dillon, that variants 
                                                          
320   Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1366-69 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
321   See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1189-90 (2002) (discussing this difference); see also Alan L. Durham, 
Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 978 (2007) (describing the § 112 PHOSITA as “a bit 
of a plodder”). 
322    Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd, 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting 
how chemistry is “often” an unpredictable art); see Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular 
Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding a chemical process for labeling 
nucleotides “highly unpredictable” at the time of invention); see also Brenner v. Manson, 
383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966) (recognizing the unpredictability of chemical compounds). See 
generally Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 5. 
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on a known chemical may likely be obvious (i.e., prima facie obvious) unless they 
embody unexpected results.323 That  principle typically applies whether the prior art 
is a single lead chemical, as in Dillon, or a genus.324  The Federal Circuit reaffirmed 
that structural rationale for a motivation to make the claimed invention based on a 
known “lead compound” just this past year—in an obviousness case.325 
But a parallel assumption is strikingly absent from the Federal Circuit’s 
enablement and written description cases over the past three decades.  To the 
contrary, the cases we discussed in Part II generally start from the premise that the 
chemical arts are unpredictable and then apply the opposite of the Dillon-type      
analysis. They assume that no one would be able to figure out what works in a 
genus unless there are “blaze marks” telling us which variants on a lead chemical 
compound will have the same effects and which ones won’t, or that even if one could 
figure it out, it would take too long to do so. The result for chemical patentees is the 
worst of both worlds—we will presume the new species you claim isn’t patentable 
because the PHOSITA could figure out how to make it if it’s just a structural 
                                                          
323   919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc); see also Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. 
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring) (noting 
the validity of subject matter involving unexpected results relative to a known compound 
was “not in question” on obviousness grounds).  For an analysis of structural similarity in 
obviousness doctrine, see Dmitry Karshtedt, Nonobviousness: Before and After, 106 IOWA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (to be posted on SSRN). 
324  Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989). If the genus in the 
prior art disclosure is extremely large, however, the motivation to make a particular species 
might not be present for obviousness purposes. See, e.g., In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 382 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994); In re Jones 958 F.2d 347, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
325   Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc. v Mylan Pharm. Inc., 955 F.3d 25, 32 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  
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variant on an existing one, but we won’t presume the PHOSITA understands the 
same thing when she is reading your genus claim. 
2. “Making and Using . . . the Full Scope of the 
Invention” 
There is a second, and more fundamental, shift in the Federal Circuit’s § 112 
case law.  The court has changed the focus of the § 112(a) inquiry from “what 
information would be required to permit the PHOSITA to make and use species in 
the invention” to “what information is required to teach the PHOSITA which 
species in the genus work and which ones don’t.”326  Put another way, thirty years 
ago § 112(a) was about use and practice of the invention, while today it’s primarily 
about understanding the boundaries of the invention.  That shift has profound 
implications for large genus claims.  It is frequently impossible to test all or even a 
“representative number” of species of a genus that may contain millions of different 
species.327  Even a patentee that tests quite a few species may be unable to predict 
which species will work and which won’t.  The question is whether that inability 
should matter, and why.   
If the goal is to enable the PHOSITA to make and use the invention, the 
inability to predict in advance which species will work doesn’t matter much except 
at the extremes.  Atlas Powder didn’t know which of its claimed dynamite 
compounds would work and which wouldn’t, but with a 40% failure rate a user 
                                                          
326  These are scare quotes. 
327 Indeed, Jeff Lefstin notes that most genus claims are open-ended and so contain a 
potentially infinite number of species.   Lefstin, supra note 60, at 1168-74. 
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would likely only have to try two or maybe three compounds to find one that would 
work.328  That required some experimentation, but the law has traditionally allowed 
claims that require experimentation as long as it is not “undue.”  There may be 
some genus claims that give so little information that trying to find a species that 
works takes too much effort, but that is likely to be rare in traditional 
pharmaceuticals claims if the genus is properly specified.329   
More to the point, it’s not what is going on in the cases we discussed in Part 
II.  Rather, those cases reflect a new and different goal for § 112(a)—explaining to 
the PHOSITA what subset of the genus claims will work and which ones won’t.  The 
goal of those cases seems to be knowledge of the precise boundaries of the genus.  
That may be desirable in some cases, as we note below.  But it isn’t normally 
required for a PHOSITA to make and use the invention without undue 
experimentation.  And it has proven in practice to be an impossible burden.  
                                                          
328  Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1577. 
329    There may be more systematic uncertainty in biotechnology, both because we know less 
about the field and because the nature of large molecules is different and less predictable 
than the small molecules the pharmaceutical industry works with.  For some biotechnology 
inventions, such as antibodies, the invention may be defined only in functional terms (as 
binding to a particular epitope of an antigen with a certain specificity), and it may well 
require undue experimentation to determine what antibodies fit within the scope of the claim 
at all.  This was at issue in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  We don’t 
want to get into the question of whether functional claiming of such antibodies is appropriate.  
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 905.  But functional antibody claims that read on any antibody binding to a specific 
epitope on an antigen may fail the traditional enablement requirement if those of skill in the 
art can’t identify and make antibodies within the scope of the claims without undue 
experimentation.  But it is that question, not the question of “did you identify all of them,” 
that should resolve cases like Sanofi. 
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3. Understanding When We Need to Understand 
What Works . . . and When We Don’t 
We think this move from undue experimentation to a search for a clear 
definition of which species work and which don’t misunderstands the basic purpose 
of the § 112(a) inquiry.  If the patentee defines a clear genus, so people will know 
whether or not the chemicals they make fall within that genus, a PHOSITA will be 
able to make and use the full scope of that genus so long as she can figure out how 
to make chemicals within the genus and determine whether they work for the 
intended purpose without having to engage in undue experimentation.  True, she 
won’t be able to make every species.  But why would she want to?  And true, the 
PHOSITA might have to experiment to figure out whether the species she made 
works for the intended purpose, but that has not been a problem so long as she 
doesn’t have to do too much experimentation.   
To be sure, there will be cases where the patent doesn’t give enough 
information to allow her to do even that much without undue experimentation.330  
But that isn’t limited to broad genus claims.  The claims may well be narrow, even 
directed to one species, but they are invalid if the specification fails to give the 
appropriate instructions, like concentrations and ratios of reagents or components, 
                                                          
330  See, e.g., Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868); Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 
How.) 1 (1846); Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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and the PHOSITA wouldn’t be able to figure out how to make the invention work at 
all. This is the traditional purpose of enablement doctrine.331 
If that isn’t true—if the PHOSITA can figure out how to make a working 
embodiment without too much effort—there is no reason to require more in most 
cases.  Cases like Wyeth,332 Idenix,333 and Boston Scientific,334 which focus on the 
number of species covered by the genus claim as a reason to reject it, miss the point. 
The genus is very large and it would take an impossible effort to identify all the 
species within its scope that work. But there is no reason anyone needs to make 
that effort (except that more and more Federal Circuit cases seem to require it).  
Anyone who wants to know if their chemical is within the scope of the claim can 
figure that out: the boundaries of the chemical genus are well-specified, and it 
doesn’t take much effort to determine whether or not any particular chemical works 
for its intended purpose.335 
                                                          
331 See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735-36 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
332   Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
333   Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
334 Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
335   Kristina Caggiano Kelly and Paul Calvo offer an excellent illustration of this.  They 
point to an artist named Martin Silfen who uses a combination of just sixteen geometric 
tiles to create paintings.  Because the tiles can be rotated and can each be used in a 
different order, there are 89 sextillion different possible tile combinations.  But no one 
needs to try all or even very many of those combinations to make the invention work; they 
just need to know to lay out 16 tiles in a 4x4 grid. Kristina Caggiano Kelly & Paul A. Calvo, 
The Scope of a Sextillion—How Courts Misapply Law of Enablement to Life Sciences, BNA 
IP LAW NEWS, May 1, 2020, available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/insight-the-
scope-of-a-sextillion-how-courts-misapply-law-of-enablement-to-life-sciences. 
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In these cases, ironically, having an operability or therapeutic efficacy 
limitation may hurt the patentee because it caused the court to focus on operability 
as an element of the inventions: “You told us the compounds are antirestenotic, but 
it’s awfully challenging to figure out which of the many chemicals having the 
generic structure will work for their intended purpose.”336 Idenix, for instance, holds 
there are no “blaze marks” for structural modifications within the large genus that 
will achieve the claimed invention’s purpose.337 But that shouldn’t matter.  A claim 
to a new chemical genus is patentable as long as it has a disclosed utility, whether 
or not that utility is claimed.338 And if the PHOSITA would know now to make and 
use the chemicals within that genus, it is enabled and adequately described under 
traditional principles.  Adding the purpose as a claim limitation narrows the claim 
rather than broadening it.  If the patentee has enabled the broad claim, it doesn’t 
make sense to hold that the narrower claim is not enabled even though the 
PHOSITA can identify and use some operable species. 
The courts that have done so seem to be articulating a concern about 
“possession” of a genus in both enablement and written description contexts—not 
that the PHOSITA can’t make and use the invention, but that the patentee can’t 
actually tell us what exactly is in the genus. Possession can sometimes matter in 
                                                          
336  Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1386 
337   Id. at 1164. 
338   See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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patent law.339 But for § 112, it should matter only in two discrete sets of 
circumstances: where we think there is no proper genus at all, or where the 
patentee hasn’t yet figured out that genus.  
Improper generalization.  In the first set of cases, the problem is that the 
patentee has defined a genus of things that don’t really have anything relevant in 
common.  The genus may well be small, but some species are not at all like the 
others given the purpose or nature of the invention, and just won’t work. 
The Incandescent Lamp Patent case,340 first discussed above,341 is a good 
example of this sort of possession problem, which we might call improper 
generalization.342  Sawyer and Man, the inventors, had built a working light bulb 
filament from carbonized paper and wood carbon, and they properly claimed those 
species.343  When it came time to define the genus, however, they guessed—and, it 
turns out, ultimately guessed wrong. While carbonized paper was in fact a species of 
the broader genus they claimed (“vegetable and fibrous material”), there was 
nothing about that genus that made it particularly well suited to work as a light 
bulb filament.  Indeed, as the defendant, Thomas Edison, later found, the vegetable 
fibers in the genus of plants interfered with rather than promoted the use of the 
                                                          
339  Cf. Holbrook, supra note 216 (arguing that possession plays a central role in this and 
other patent law doctrines).        
340 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
341 See supra Part I.A.3. 
342   Incandescent Lamp, 259 U.S. at 472. 
343 See id. 
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material as a filament.344  Sawyer and Man hadn’t taught how to make and use the 
genus claim, not simply because it took a lot of experimentation to figure out what 
plant species worked, but because the genus was essentially a random collection of 
things.  Sawyer and Man might as well have claimed a genus of “filaments 
beginning with the letter P.” The Corona Cord Tire case, in which the Supreme 
Court faulted the patentee for improperly generalizing from a disclosed species, 
appears to be to the same effect.345  
Improper generalization is not about the overall size of the genus, or even the 
number of inoperative embodiments,346 though if you haven’t figured out what the 
relevant genus is there will often be a lot of examples that don’t work.  Rather, the 
problem is ultimately one of possession—the patentee didn’t invent a genus because 
she didn’t actually identify a group of chemicals with a relevant property in 
common.347  That should disqualify even a small genus, because the patentee in 
reality hasn’t disclosed a genus at all. 
 Relatedly, the improper generalization rationale can invalidate claims on 
truly nascent technologies. Cases like Amgen v. Chugai and Enzo v. Calgene reflect 
                                                          
344   Id. 
345 Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 385 (1928); see supra notes  
346   In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1938), for instance, rejects a genus with only four 
species in it because the patentee gave no indication that it thought the invention was a 
property of that genus and included no broadening language in the specification. 
347  See Brian P. O’Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus: Developing a New Approach for 
Analyzing the Sufficiency of Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147 (1996). 
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this principle.348 Even granting that the patents at issue in those two cases provided 
some examples of how to make the inventions as claimed, the patentee shouldn’t be 
permitted to lock up an entire new field of research if these teachings generalize 
only thanks to luck. Therefore, we believe that the judgments of invalidity in 
Chugai and Calgene were correct.  
Conversely, though, a properly defined genus sharing a relevant structural 
characteristic shouldn’t be invalidated for improper generalization simply because 
the group has many members, some of which may not work. As long as the 
technology is advanced enough that the PHOSITA can figure out which ones work 
and which ones don’t, she has the information she needs to make and use the 
invention. 
Gun jumping and late claiming. The second set of circumstances in which 
possession matters for genus claims is tied to the timing of those claims.  This is, 
first and foremost, the proper province of the written description requirement.  The 
claim may well be narrow and even enabled as to making, but the inventor raced to 
the PTO before they actually had the invention figured out (gun jumping), or 
alternatively wrote an amended claim after they figured it out but sought to get an 
earlier priority date for it (late claiming). 
Gun jumping is common in the chemical and biotechnological arts, because 
the importance of patents leads to a race to be first.  And in the modern world, being 
                                                          
348 See supra Part II.A. 
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first means being first to file an application with the PTO.349   Gun jumping is 
frequently associated with functional claiming—identifying a problem and claiming 
“anything that solves that problem.”  The law disfavors functional claims, and 
normally limit them to the specific examples the patentee has identified.350  One 
example is Ariad v. Eli Lilly.351 In Ariad the patentee claimed the idea of creating 
chemicals to have a particular effect, but couldn’t give any examples of chemicals 
that would fit that genus.352 
Notably, the problem with gun jumping isn’t that the claim is too broad per 
se, though many functional claims are quite broad.  Had Ariad identified some 
specific chemicals that inhibited the biological pathway it discovered, it may well 
have taught people enough to make and use a broader genus of those chemicals.  
Rather, the problem is that the patentee didn’t get there yet, and the law does not 
want them to discourage further work by those who do actually take the time to find 
the solution and not just predict it.353 
                                                          
349    Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284, sec. 3 (2011) 
350    35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012); see also Lemley, supra note _, at 910-19 (discussing the 
history of functional claiming). 
351    Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
352      Id.; cf. Nuvo Pharm. (Ir.) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Inc., 923 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (striking down the claims under written description for lack of proof of 
therapeutic efficacy at time of filing); In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (striking down claims for lack of how-to-use enablement, i.e., lack of utility, 
for similar reasons).  How to use enablement can be a problem under Manson even if the 
utility is not recited as a limitation. 
353 Cf. generally Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (2009); John F. Duffy et al., Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A 
Discussion on the Legal and Economic Effects of Publishing Patent Applications after 
Eighteen Months of Filing, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, 
Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U.L. REV. 1171 (2016). 
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Timing can also be a problem in the opposite direction when the patentee 
didn’t actually see an aspect of her own invention until after filing.  In the well-
known case of Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., for instance, the patentee came up 
with an improvement in sofa technology that allowed two sofa sections side by side 
to recline. It built a fixed console to house the controls for the sofa recliner 
section.354  When it saw that competitors found other places to put the controls, it 
retroactively changed its patent claims to cover any location for the controls.      
A patentee who tries to retroactively fix its claims in this manner isn’t 
entitled to assert that they owned the invention all along.  They weren’t in 
possession of the invention they now claim when they filed their patent.  The 
problem isn’t that the PHOSITA couldn’t make or use the invention; a reasonable 
sofa designer could easily imagine a number of places to put the controls.  Rather, 
the problem is that the patentee didn’t actually think of the genus they now lay 
claim to at the time they filed their patent application.   
     The enablement cases dealing with improper generalization and written 
description cases dealing with gun jumping or unsupported claiming make sense, 
and they define a legitimate set of circumstances to cabin genus claims. But they 
aren’t cabining those claims simply because they are too broad.  They are cabining 
the claims because the patentee couldn’t or didn’t actually identify the genus in a 
meaningful way at the time it filed its patent application.  Unfortunately, courts 
have expanded those specific circumstances in which a possession inquiry makes 
                                                          
354 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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sense into a general requirement that patentees must “possess” the full scope of the 
invention, by which they seem to mean “know which species work and which ones 
don’t.”355  We have converted the full-scope enablement inquiry from “did I teach 
you enough that you can make use of the full scope of the invention” (which allows 
some inoperative species, à la Atlas Powder, as long as people can figure out 
whether a particular species works without too much effort) to “did I give you 
enough information to figure out the full list of what works and what 
doesn’t?”  That is an impossible requirement to meet.  It doesn’t serve the purposes 
of § 112.  It’s asking the wrong question, because it’s confusing possession of the 
genus (a written description question) with how people can use what you taught 
them (an enablement question).   
That category error is at the heart of the demise of genus claims in the 
chemical arts today.  And it’s not something patentees can simply draft around. A 
chemical genus with any decently large number of species will never be able to 
satisfy the Idenix court. The claims might be in danger of failing enablement 
because the testing will take time, but that is not even the worst of the inventor’s 
problems. No matter how much testing the patentee does, there will always be 
untested species, and because those species aren’t tested we won’t know whether 
they are properly included in the genus, so the claim would fail written description. 
That doesn’t matter under the old view of the world; all that we cared about was 
                                                          
355 For a discussion of enablement as possession, see Holbrook, supra note 216, at 146-61. 
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whether the PHOSITA could make a species and figure out whether it worked.  But 
it is fatal to genus claims in the new world.356      
B. Can Pharmaceutical Patent Owners Survive Without Genus 
Claims? 
Patent protection is understood to be important in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries, perhaps more than anywhere else.  Certainly, the 
industries themselves seem to think so.  Policy disputes in courts and Congress over 
the past two decades have time and again seen the chemical and biomedical 
industries line up behind strong protection, with the software and Internet 
industries on the opposite side.357  As Dan Burk and Mark Lemley explain, those 
political differences reflect very real differences in how the industries use and 
experience the patent system.358  Patents really are more important to those 
industries than to others.  Further, the patent system seems to function more like it 
was designed to in the chemical industries.  The scope of claims is clearer, 
                                                          
356   This new full scope doctrine has been exported to United Kingdom law. See Regeneron 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Kymab, Ltd., [2020] UKSC 27 (holding that showing “some 
embodiments” is not enough, and that “[e]nablement across the scope of a product claim is 
not established merely by showing that all products within the relevant range will . . . deliver 
the same general benefit . . .”). 
357    See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R43264, TAILORING THE 
PATENT SYSTEM FOR SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES (2015); WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RES. SERV., 
RL33367, PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES (2006). 
358    BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 355, Part II, Ch. 5; see also Mark A. 
Lemley & Dan L. Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615 (2003) (“The 
range of patent theories parallels the range of ways in which the patent system affects 
companies in different industries.”). 
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independent invention is rarer, “stacking” of multiple patents is less common,359 
and the slower pace of change means that a company thinking of making a product 
could search for and find the relevant patents, something that is not true in many 
other industries.360  Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer have gone so far as to suggest 
that the patent system works only in the biomedical industries.361 
Given the perceived importance of strong patent protection in these 
industries, the unwillingness of courts to permit chemical genus claims seems quite 
troubling as a policy as well as a doctrinal matter.  And yet those industries seem to 
be doing just fine.  Pharmaceutical patent owners are making record revenues, up 
more than 800% from 1992 to 2017.362  They are still obtaining patents in record 
numbers.363  They continue to enforce patents in court; the number of 
pharmaceutical patent suits filed has remained steady even as patent suits overall 
have dropped in the last few years.364  They are suing on larger and larger patent 
                                                          
359   But cf. Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCI. 590 (2018). 
360    JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 89-93 (2008) (discussing the qualities of the 
pharmaceutical industry that allow to that are amenable to the patent system). 
361   Id. 
362    Michael A. Carrier, Mark A. Lemley & Shawn Miller, Playing Both Sides: Brand Sales, 
Generic Drugs, and Antitrust Policy, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 307, 317 (2019).  True, other 
industries may have a greater profit margin, but the fact that pharmaceutical companies 
keep increasing revenues and investing more and more in developing drugs suggests they 
see it as a profitable business.  
363   Id. 
364   See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-
on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
299, 316-17 (2010) (analyzing the increase in the number of patents per drug from 1985 to 
2005). 
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portfolios.365   When they  do take patents to court, chemical patents win more often 
and are less likely to be invalidated than patents in any other technology.366   
 What is going on?  Why does innovation and even patent litigation seem to be 
proceeding apace in the pharmaceutical industry at the same time the genus claims 
that are supposed to be so critical are being struck down left and right?  We see two 
possible answers. 
 First, it may be that the pharmaceutical industry simply hasn’t internalized 
the sea change we describe here.  They are patenting and litigating (and 
innovating) as if the law remained the way it was thirty years ago. 
The reader should be skeptical of this claim. It is worth reiterating exactly 
what it entails: in a critical sector of the economy—the one in which patents matter 
the most—dozens of appellate decisions have fundamentally rewritten the law in 
ways that threaten to undermine its very purpose . . . and no one really noticed!367  
That is surprising, if true.  It’s not that no one cares about patents.  To the contrary, 
the industries affected here not only say they care a lot, but they invest a lot in 
obtaining patents, in filing and fighting patent lawsuits, and in lobbying Congress 
                                                          
365 See id.; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme 
Court, 339 SCI. 1386 (discussing the rise of secondary patents). 
366    John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (2015). Note that those numbers conceal significant variation by 
industry.  Pharmaceutical patents do very well but biotechnology industry patents do quite 
poorly. 
367 This covert rewriting of patent law evokes the theories of “acoustic separation” and 
“selective transmission” that Dan-Cohen proposed while analyzing the relationship between 
conduct rules and decision rules in criminal law. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and 
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
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to change the law in their favor.368  And some of the cases we describe here have 
billions of dollars at stake.  One would think lawyers and clients would have ample 
incentive to keep up with the intricacies of the law and, having done so, would 
notice the fundamental shift we describe. 
We ourselves are skeptical of this explanation, for just that reason.  Indeed, 
in an earlier draft of this paper we dismissed it out of hand.  But we have received a 
surprising number of comments from both lawyers and scholars along the lines of 
“but that can’t be true, what about case x, where the patent owner won with a genus 
claim?”  In every such case we examined, however, the patent owner won because 
the defendant didn’t raise full-scope enablement or written description 
arguments.369  That suggests two things.  First, patentees are in fact winning cases 
because defendants don’t realize they have a powerful new tool to challenge those 
patents.  Second, both lawyers and scholars are buying into the conventional 
wisdom.  So we can’t discount the possibility that knowledge of legal change diffuses 
slowly, and that many key players simply haven’t yet realized how different modern 
Federal Circuit precedent is.  That’s surprising, if true.  It’s also troubling, because 
it suggests that innovation might suffer as genus patentees gradually realize they 
are playing a losing game.   
                                                          
368   The United States’ largest companies spent an average of $3.3 billion on IP litigation, 
about $1.5 million per matter, in 2019. Morrison & Foerster, Benchmarking IP Litigation 
2019 (2019). Congress’s attempts to update the patent in 2005 became an arduous seven-
year saga culminating in enactment of America Invents Act in 2011. Joe Matal, A Guide to 
the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2011). 
369 See, e.g., Immunex Corp v. Sandoz Inc., 964 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  
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If ignorance of the law is not the explanation, the alternative is perhaps even 
more striking.  Maybe the merits of patent doctrine don’t matter that much to 
innovation, even in the very industry where they are supposed to matter most.  One 
of us has previously documented the “surprising resilience” of patent law.370  
Lemley argues that the patent system as a whole has kept operating pretty much 
the way it always has regardless of changes in the law that either strengthen or 
weaken patent protection.  He speculates that the real value companies find in 
patents may have little or nothing to do with the ability to enforce those patents in 
court, so changes in legal doctrine that affect whether courts ultimately find patents 
valid and infringed simply may not matter very much in practice.371  Perhaps 
pharmaceutical genus claims are just another example of the resilience of the 
patent system. 
 One reason to think that might be true with genus claims is that the cases we 
have discussed almost all involve infringement suits, not the inventor’s challenges 
to the PTO’s refusal to grant a patent.  That’s not an accident.  The PTO does 
notoriously little examination or rejection based on enablement and written 
description.372  That means that the Federal Circuit’s changes in the law don’t stop 
                                                          
370   Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2016). 
371   Id. at 8-10. 
372 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description 
Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1167 (2010) (concluding it is 
indeed “exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on written description”); 
(internal quotations omitted); Janet Freilich, Matching and Digging: Evidentiary Analysis 
at the Patent Office (on file with the authors). But cf. Greg Reilly, The Complicated 
Relationship of Patent Examination and Invalidation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1095 (2020) 
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companies from getting patents; they just make many of those patents 
unenforceable if they ever get to court.  And getting to court can take more than a 
decade.373  If you just care about having a patent for its own sake—for vanity, to 
trade with others, to lure venture investment, to structure licensing deals for your 
underlying technology, or as an asset when you sell the company—the fact that it 
may turn out not to be enforceable down the line simply doesn’t matter very 
much.374 
 Even those who rely on enforcing patents may not care as much as we expect.  
As Lemley explains, much of the value of patent litigation can come from filing 
cases, not winning them.375  That is especially true in the pharmaceutical industry, 
where the brand firm’s mere act of filing a suit against a “generic” competitor, no 
matter how weak the patent, gets the patent owner an automatic 30-month delay in 
the generic entering the market.376  And brand firms often don’t even need to file a 
                                                          
(arguing that “stretching” of claim scope in infringement cases can contribute to the 
disconnect between prosecution and litigation.).  On the disconnect between prosecution 
and litigation, see Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1551 (2017). 
373    John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 185 (1998) (finding the average lag time between patent filing and 
dispute resolution is over twelve years). 
374 Lemley, Surprising Resilience, supra note 382.  There is a robust literature on non-
litigation uses for patents. See generally, Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 
625 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 137 (2000); Hanna Hottenrott, Bronwyn H. Hall & Dirk Czarnitzki, 
Patents as quality signals? The implications for financing constraints on R&D, 25 ECON. 
INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 197 (2016); and Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde & Alexander 
Ljungqvist, What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the US Patent “Lottery”, 75 J. OF FIN. 
639 (2020). 
375   Lemley, Surprising Resilience, supra note 382, at 47. 
376    21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), (j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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patent case until after years of regulatory exclusivity administered by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) expires.377  Further, most patent cases settle, and until 
recently pharmaceutical cases in particular frequently settled with the patent 
owner paying the generic company to stay off the market for some period of time.378  
When we couple that with the fact that, as further discussed below, the species 
claim may be enough to prevent generic entry, the loss of genus claims may not 
matter all that much in pharmaceutical and biotechnology cases against generic 
and biosimilar firms. 
Indeed, in significant swaths of the pharmaceutical industry, the species 
claim may be more important than the genus claim because of regulatory 
exclusivities and the FDA’s requirements for generics.  The pharmaceutical patent 
owner may claim a genus, but it sells a specific chemical.  That’s what gets FDA 
approval, and that’s what is entitled to regulatory exclusivity.379  If a competitor 
                                                          
377   See Eisenberg, supra note 365. 
378 See generally, Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 
18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 249 (2019); William Choi, Bruce Den Uyl & Mat Huges, Pay-
for-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Lundbeck, Actavis, and others, 5 J. EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 44 (2014). That is less true after the Supreme Court decision in 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013), which held that those agreements generally 
violate the antitrust laws. But a surprising number of settlements still involve concealed 
payments. See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
404 (3d Cir. 2015) (“It seems to us that no-AG agreements are likely to present the same 
types of problems as reverse payments of cash.”); Aaron Edlin et. al, Activating Actavis, 28 
ANTITRUST 16 (2013). 
379   Regulatory exclusivity gives the first company to submit a new drug for approval a 
period of time during which no one can use their data or tests to get a generic equivalent 
drug approved.  Those exclusivity periods are independent of patent rights.  See generally 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How 
Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 
(2003); John R. Thomas, The End of “Patent Medicines”? Thoughts on the Rise of Regulatory 
Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39 (2015). 
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wants to make a different chemical than the one the patentee does, it has to go 
through the same expensive, time-consuming New Drug Application (NDA) process 
the patentee did.  To take advantage of the cheaper, faster Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) process, generic companies that file with the FDA need to copy 
the patentee’s specific drug, not substitute a different species in the same genus.  
That is even more true if they hope to take advantage of state generic substitution 
laws that allow pharmacists to fill brand name drug prescriptions with cheaper 
generics.  The generic drug must be identical (or “AB-rated”) to the one 
prescribed.380             
That means that for the most important class of pharmaceutical patent 
cases—litigation against generics—it is the patent on the specific chemical actually 
sold, not the genus claim, that is important.381   That may explain an otherwise-
curious feature of enablement and written description cases: even though most 
pharmaceutical company litigation is against generics, almost all of the § 112(a) 
cases involving genus claims are against competing brand companies. It is only in 
those competitor cases where genus claims really matter.  That doesn’t mean there 
is no problem with eliminating genus claims.  Those competitor cases may drive 
certain classes of innovation, pushing pharmaceutical research away from “me-too” 
                                                          
380 See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug 
Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1029 (2019). 
381   At least, that is true for the active ingredient, which must be identical to the marketed 
one.  Generic companies have more ability to vary formulations of excipients, so genus claims 
may be more important in ANDA litigation over such secondary patents. 
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drugs towards new classes of treatments.  But it may help explain why the sky has 
not fallen on the pharmaceutical industry even as those genus claims fail.       
 Large-molecule life science and biotechnology fields—which produce so-called 
“biologic” drugs—are in a similar, though not identical, position.  Until quite 
recently there was no process for approval for so-called “biosimilars”—the 
biotechnology equivalent of generic substitutes.  So anyone who wanted to make a 
variant on the patentee’s species had to go through the same approval process the 
patentee did.  There is now the rough equivalent of an ANDA for biosimilars, but it 
has the same characteristic for our purposes as the ANDA process does: the 
biosimilar needs to copy the actual species that was approved, not just some 
chemical in the broader genus.382  Indeed, making biosimilars is significantly harder 
than making generic pharmaceuticals, both because Congress extended data 
exclusivity from five years in the case of pharmaceuticals to twelve years for biologic 
drugs (meaning that the ANDA can’t get approved until much later)383 and because 
copying biotechnological materials turns out to be much harder and less certain 
than copying small-molecule chemicals.384   
 As a result, genus claims may not actually be needed to prevent copying by 
generics in either the pharmaceutical and biologics industries, but only to stop 
                                                          
382    These chemicals often appear naturally in the human body, making substitution in the 
case of biosimilars even harder to justify. 
383    47 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(a). 
384 Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015); W. Nicholson 
Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2016). 
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competing new chemical or biological entities made by competing branded drug 
companies. And while restricting that competition can be important to 
pharmaceutical companies, they may have enough incentive to invent based on the 
regulatory exclusivities and the costs competitors will face even if the weakness of 
genus claims ultimately leads to competition from other branded firms doing their 
own NDAs. The fact that competitors can’t cheaply or quickly enter the market with 
a different species, but must go through their own FDA approval process, gives the 
patent owners substantial time in which to recoup its expenses.385  The industry 
may also use mergers and acquisitions to blunt the effect of some of this 
competition.386 
 If that is the explanation, it suggests that we may need to rethink our patent 
policies.  The pharmaceutical industry is the poster child for strong patent 
protection.  If it turns out the industry does just fine with narrow patent protection 
coupled with regulatory limits on copying, without the need for patents that prevent 
companies from marketing their own competing drugs that aren’t identical to the 
patentee’s, a major part of the case for expansive patent protection disappears.  
We’re not persuaded that is true.  Genus claims seem important to us.  But the fact 
that the sky hasn’t fallen on the pharmaceutical industry as they have been 
                                                          
385    See BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 355, at 132-34 (discussing how the 
relative costs of innovating to copying as a policy consideration in intellectual property). 
386   Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping 
Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1217-21 (2019) (documenting consolidation in 
the pharmaceutical industry and linking it to the need to acquire valuable patents).  
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systematically invalidated should give us pause, requiring further inquiry into how 
much patent protection really is necessary. 
The fact that a major change in pharmaceutical patent law doesn’t seem to 
have affected industry behavior doesn’t mean we should ignore legal doctrine.  But 
it may be healthy to temper our disputes over legal doctrine with a recognition that 
law in action may diverge substantially from the law on the books.387  The story of 
genus claims is a remarkable example of how a sophisticated industry and its 
lawyers keep operating as if the law still works the way it once did (and the way 
they would like it to). 
C. Implications for Other Industries 
 None of this regulatory structure exists for non-medical chemistry.  A solvent, 
a new petroleum blend, or an agricultural biotechnology invention doesn’t get 
regulatory exclusivities or face generic substitution laws.  Early competitive entry 
may be more likely in those industries in the absence of effective genus claims.  So 
we shouldn’t be completely sanguine about the continued success of the chemical 
industries outside the pharmaceutical arena despite the invalidity of genus claims.  
The change in the law may still have significant effects in those industries, as well 
as in competitor cases in the life sciences.  
Further, the rules the Federal Circuit is applying to genus claims may 
reverberate beyond chemistry altogether.  While Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue 
that the Federal Circuit applies different § 112 rules to the life sciences rules than 
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it does elsewhere,388 the court denies doing so, taking the position that its doctrines 
apply across the board.389  Traditionally we have not seen strict application of the 
§ 112 doctrines to either the mechanical arts or to the IT industry,390 perhaps 
because of the court’s intonation that those arts are “predictable.”391  Indeed, the 
absence of effective enablement and written description doctrines in software has 
led to functional claiming—patent claims that target the problem to be solved and 
cover any solution to that problem.392 
But that is changing.  The Federal Circuit’s insistence on applying doctrines 
like written description across all technology areas has led it to invalidate software 
and hardware claims for lack of written description.393  And it has sometimes 
                                                          
388    Burk & Lemley, Technology Specific, supra note 323 at 41; Burk & Lemley, Policy 
Levers, supra note 356 at 1652-53. 
389   Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).   
390   BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 355. 
391    See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing predictable technologies); 
Kevin E. Collins, supra note 299, at 1121 (discussing the enablement requirement with 
software inventions). In the early days of computer programming, courts considered the act 
of translating thoughts into code “a mere clerical function to a skilled programmer.” In re 
Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding disclosure of “menial” tools used 
in programming unnecessary.). More recently, however, this view shifted in favor of more 
disclosure. See, e.g., Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (holding that “that one of skill in the art could program a computer to perform the 
recited functions cannot create structure where none otherwise is disclosed”); LizardTech, 
Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding “describing 
one embodiment of the thing” was not sufficient for an enabling disclosure of a claimed 
software invention). 
392   Lemley, Functional Claiming, supra note __; see Otis Elevator Co. v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 68 
F.2d 664 (9th Cir.), supplemented on reh’g, 71 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1934).    
393    See, e.g., Taylor v. Iancu, 809 F. App’x 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) 
(affirming claims for a GPS information system were invalid for lack of written description); 
Realtime Data, LLC v. Morgan Stanley, 554 F. App’x 923, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(nonprecedential) (affirming claims relating to data transmission and encryption systems 
were invalid for lack of written description). 
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applied the idea of “full scope enablement” to invalidate “genus” claims outside 
chemistry, even where those genuses are quite small.394 A number of commentators 
have noted the conflict between single-embodiment and full-scope enablement in 
non-pharmaceutical cases.395  We may see more such cases in the future. 
Restricting broad claims in fields like IT may be less troubling than in the 
chemical arts.  After all, abundant evidence suggests that broad patent protection is 
less important in IT than in other industries.396  And laxness in enforcing § 112 in 
those industries has led to endemic problems with overbroad patents not tied to any 
particular technology.  At the same time, however, the “full scope enablement” idea 
seems troubling in many areas of technology.  As Jeff Lefstin reminds us, almost all 
patent claims are directed to an indefinitely large genus in some sense because they 
incorporate various concepts that could be implemented in multiple ways and 
because you can add more to them without avoiding infringement.397  Too strict a 
focus on the full scope of the claim rather than what the PHOSITA could figure out 
could in theory doom most patent claims in a variety of fields.   
IV. Conclusion 
                                                          
394    Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 896 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding 
patent relating to a semiconductor device did not teach the full scope of the claimed 
invention.) 
395   Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 537-38 (2010); 
Chao, supra note _, at 7.  But cf. Rantanen, supra note _, at 1683 (denying there is a split); 
see also supra (discussing the “genus of methods” problem).  
396    BESSEN & MEURER, PATENT FAILURE, supra note 357; BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT 
CRISIS, supra note 355. 
397   Lefstin, supra note 60, at 1168-74. 
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      The story of genus claims is a story of the disconnect between the past and 
the present, between perception and reality, and between theory and practice. 
Patent law has always venerated the genus claim.  Patent lawyers and patent 
owners still do. But courts have changed their mind—and changed the law—to such 
a dramatic extent that patent owners who sue on genus claims almost always lose 
at the Federal Circuit.  And yet life continues much as it did before.  In part that 
reflects the fact that people have not recognized the size or importance of the 
change in the law.  But it may also indicate that the law itself matters less than we 
think, even for companies that seem to depend on patent law for their livelihoods.        
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